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Restricting the Freedom of Contract: A
Fundamental Prohibition
David P. Weber*
[T~he movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from
Status to Contract.'
-- Sir Henry Maine
The first principle of a civilized state is that power is legitimate only when it is un-
der contract.2
-- Walter Lippmann
[F]reedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right.3
-- Chief Justice Charles Hughes
This article argues that the general right to contract, that is to say the
ability of one to obligate himself in exchange for another's obligation in re-
turn, is a fundamental (or basic) though not all-encompassing right and
one that is subject to additional legal protections especially when limita-
tions are sought to be imposed discriminatorily or based on status rather
than capacity or subject matter of the contract. While post-Lochner deci-
sions have given states considerable leeway to regulate the scope of free-
dom of contract, restrictions based on status, especially the status of unau-
thorized immigrants, are invidious and go beyond the ambit of the type of
state regulation previously permitted. This article concludes that a prohi-
bition on the right to contract based solely on unauthorized immigration
status in the United States likely violates the Civil Rights Act and the
U.S. Constitution on preemption, due process and equal protection
grounds, and, to the extent executed contracts are involved, on Contract
* Associate Professor of Law at Creighton University School of Law. The author would
like to thank researcher Shane Strong for his tireless assistance.
1. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (Ashley Montagu ed., Univ. of Ariz. Press
1986) (1861).
2. WALTER LIPPMANN, ESSAYS IN THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 167 (Transaction Publishers
1989) (1955).
3. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy .R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549,567 (1911).
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Clause grounds as well. The article analyzes other circumstances in which
states and the federal government have previously restricted the right to
contract based on status, and finds in nearly every case that the restriction
of the right to contract affected members of a suspect class based on immu-
table characteristics such as race, national origin, alienage, gender, or ser-
vitude. While the Supreme Court has previously concluded immigration
status is not a suspect class, this article argues that states' illicit use of
immigration status as a proxy for race, national origin or alienage suffices
to meet the Arlington Heights test for disparate impact and therefore qual-
ifies for strict scrutiny.
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to contract is one of those fundamental rights in our society
that is frequently lauded and rightly receives primary credit for the estab-
lishment of a functional, market-based economy in which predictability is
prized.4 This right is so ingrained that whenever we do hear about in-
fringement of the right to contract, it is usually historical, such as limita-
tions on women's right to contract prior to the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries5 or the rights of slaves or indentured servants preceding the twen-
tieth century.6 In addition, the supremacy of contract in our society has
evolved from solely a mercantile instrument to one that encompasses
transactions that are either not commercial or only tangentially so. Com-
mon examples include child custody agreements which are essentially
court-affirmed contracts, surrogacy agreements, cohabitation agreements
(prenuptials without the nuptials), divorce settlements, etc. 7 Given the
prevalence of contract in modern society, it is difficult to imagine how any-
one could live without that right.8
4. See generally DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY TO CONTRAcr: REDISCOVERING A LOsT
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 1-10 (2011) (arguing for a return to the "Lochner era" of American
constitutional law and the return of the fundamental right to contract).
5. See generally Ward Farnsworth, Women Under Reconstruction: The Congressional Under-
standing, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1229 (2000) (describing the genesis of women's right to contract
from the Reconstruction era to its present form).
6. See generally Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to
the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1 (1995) (discussing the inability for slaves to contract).
7. See Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 1038-40 (1995) (discussing the economic advantages of commercial
and family contracts and noting that, although still viewed unfavorably by the courts, the
scope of family-based contracts has recently expanded significantly); see also Orit Gan, Contrac-
tual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 171, 208-220 (2013) (highlighting the
common use of contract law in separate and prenuptial agreements).
8. In 2011, Alabama attempted to nearly eliminate the private right to contract for unaut-
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This article focuses on the larger question of the role states should play
in determining the right of persons to contract and whether federal limita-
tions should operate to curtail state action in this arena. While in some con-
texts states have successfully limited the right to contract based on status,
9
or capacity,10 those limitations are an exception to the general rule of the
freedom of contract. This is especially true in cases of status, whereby a
state could declare a contract invalid because of who was entering into the
contract, rather than for what purpose the contract was executed.
Alabama's Hammon-Beason Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection
Act, HB 56, provides that a contract is void based on the immigration status
of one of the parties." This article focuses on only two sections of the law
12
horized immigrants. ALA. CODE § 31-13-26 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (restricting the private
right to contract except in the limited context of necessities).
9. Such as when a foreign corporation is not registered in the state. E.g. ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 10-1501(A) (2012), NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-20,168(1) (2012), ALA. CODE § 1OA-2-15.01
(2012).
10. The traditional grounds are mental illness, intoxication or infirmity. E.g., ALA. CODE §
8-1-170 (2012) (voiding contracts of insane persons and exceptions), CAL. CIV. CODE § 38 (West
2012) (voiding contracts of persons without understanding); Matz v. Martinson, 149 N.W. 370
(Minn. 1914) (allowing for voidability of contracts if entered into by an intoxicated party that
was unable to comprehend its terms).
11. The Hammon-Beason bill was passed and signed into law on June 9, 2011. The
Hammon-Beason law purports, as is clearly stated in its legislative findings, to negatively af-
fect immigrants in a myriad of ways including: expanding the sphere in which law enforce-
ment can stop immigrants, eliminating the receipt of public benefits including the ability to
attend public post-secondary institutions, the mandatory ascertainment of immigration status
of all public school children, restricting the ability to rent property, directing the mandatory
use of E-Verify, and restricting the ability to contract to "discourage illegal immigration." ALA.
CODE § 31-13-2 et seq. (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). The law was specifically crafted to curtail un-
authorized immigration. See ALA. CODE § 31-13-2 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). While the legisla-
tive findings themselves never specifically mention the limit on contract, they do focus on the
following:
The State of Alabama further finds that certain practices currently allowed in
this state impede and obstruct the enforcement of federal immigration law,
undermine the security of our borders, and impermissibly restrict the privi-
leges and immunities of the citizens of Alabama... The State of Alabama also
finds that other measures are necessary to ensure the integrity of various
governmental programs and services.
ALA. CODE § 31-13-2 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). Sections 27 and 30 make more explicit the attack
on the right to contract. ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-26, 31-13-29 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). The law was
noted as one of the most draconian anti-immigrant laws in the country, and was quickly chal-
lenged and partially enjoined. See Michael A. Olivas, The Political Efficacy of Plyler v. Doe: The
Danger and the Discourse, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 7 (2011); see also ACLU, Preliminary Analysis
of HB 56 "Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act," available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/prelimanalysis alabama hb56_0.pdf. While the district
and appellate courts initially denied the injunction as to the sections regarding the right to
contract, United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1345, 1349-51 (N.D. Ala. 2011); Unit-
ed States v. Alabama, 443 F. App'x. 411, 420 (11th Cir. 2011), the Eleventh Circuit eventually
reversed its preliminary decision and enjoined those sections as well. Order enjoining Ala-
bama's enforcement of Sections 27 and 30 of HB 56, United States v. Alabama, No. 11-14532-
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which strike at the heart of the viability of an individual's existence in a
modern society by eliminating his right to contract.13 Even without discuss-
ing work authorization or the ability to obtain employment, eliminating the
basic right to contract would likely have rapid, severe consequences as in-
dividuals find their ability to contract for necessities nonexistent. Under the
Hammon-Beason Act, housing agreements (in excess of one night), trans-
portation agreements, airfare or vehicle purchase agreements (other than a
contract to return the immigrant to his country of origin), service agree-
ments, purchase agreements, etc. would all be subject to nullification. 14
This article argues that the general right to contract, that is to say the
ability of one to obligate himself in exchange for another's obligation in re-
turn, is a fundamental (or basic) though not all-encompassing right and one
that is subject to additional legal protections especially when limitations are
sought to be imposed based on status rather than capacity or subject matter
of the contract.15 The more difficult question then becomes the determina-
tion of legitimate versus illegitimate restrictions on the right to contract
when the restrictions are based on status. This article concludes that re-
strictions on the right to contract based solely on status should generally
not be upheld, on multiple legal grounds.
Applying the foregoing analysis in the context of the Hammon-Beason
Act, this article argues that a prohibition on the right to contract based sole-
ly on unauthorized immigration status in the United States likely violates
the Civil Rights Act and the U.S. Constitution on preemption, due process
and equal protection grounds, and, as originally conceived, on Contract
Clause grounds as well. In addition, giving judicial imprimatur to a legal
framework which would eliminate a fundamental right of a vulnerable
class of individuals would further harm and destabilize that group and ex-
acerbate underlying racial tensions which are not dissimilar to those expe-
rienced during the civil rights struggle, which eventually culminated in the
Civil Rights Era of the 1960s.
CC (11th Cir., Mar. 8, 2012).
12. ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-26, 31-13-29 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
13. Id.
14. The law would allow for contracts for lodging for one night, the purchase of food,
medical services, legal fees and transportation to the country of origin. H.B. 658, 2012 Leg.
Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012).
15. This Article does not discuss the ability of states to regulate the subject matter of con-
tracts as their ability to do so has long been evident in the field of public policy. States may,
without question, declare void contracts entered into for an illegal purpose or regarding an
illegal subject, strike down restrictive covenants based on improper geographic scope, dura-
tion or subject matter, or even contracts freely entered into which are against the general pub-
lic policies of the state. The key difference between this power and the right to contract dis-
cussed is the state purporting to hold invalid a contract based on the identity of one of the
parties rather than the purpose of the contract.
54 [Vol. 16
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II. CONTRACT AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Throughout this article I will refer to status versus capacity. Status, as
defined by Black's Law Dictionary, has a variety of meanings which can in-
clude a person's legal condition,16 a person's capacity and incapacity,' 7 or
"a person's legal condition . . . imposed by the law without the person's
consent, as opposed to a condition that the person has acquired by agree-
ment."'8 It is this last definition of status that this paper focuses on. Perhaps
tellingly, the example provided by Black's for that definition is "the status
of a slave." 19 In prior generations, individuals prevented from contract on
the basis of status alone have been so treated due to race, gender, religion,
national origin, etc.20 It seems unlikely that it is mere coincidence that many
of those denied the right to contract are the same groups that largely com-
prise our suspect classes under the law of equal protection. In fact, status is
now generally only used
... in English Law, in connection ... with those comparatively few
classes of persons in the community who, by reason of their con-
spicuous differences from normal persons, and the fact that by no
decision of their own can they get rid of these differences, require
separate consideration in an account of the law. 21
In contrast, when this Article mentions capacity, it uses the term apply-
16. Examples would be the status of "landowner" or "trustee." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1542 (9th ed. 2009).
17. Examples here include minors, or mentally disabled individuals. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 235 (9th ed. 2009).
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1542 (9th ed. 2009).
19. Id. According to historians, the word "status" initially was only a descriptive term
that noted an individual's position before the law. EDWARD JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW
109 (P.B. Fairest ed., 6th ed. 1967). "Therefore, every person (except slaves, who were not re-
garded as persons, for legal purposes) had a status," even though that trend gradually de-
creased to a very few discrete categories. Id.
20. See GEORGE JAMES BAYLES, WOMAN AND THE LAW 14-15 (New York 1901) (describing
laws prohibiting miscegenation while noting that individuals in states with those laws would
deemed to lack the lawful ability to marry based on race). E.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, Pt. 1, Art.
3 (identifying any "demonination of Christians" as being entitled to equal protection of the
law); H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE U.S. § 8.1, at 498-502 (2nd ed. 1987)
(discussing the limitations of women to contract), James A. Frechter, Alien Landownership In
The United States: A Matter Of State Control, 14 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 147 (1988) (reviewing state
laws in the United States which disallowed aliens from purchasing land).
21. EDWARD JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 109 (P.B. Fairest ed., 6th ed. 1967).
2013] 55
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ing its standard meaning. Capacity is, generally stated, the legal ability of
an individual to enter into a binding agreement.22 Under current law, con-
tractual incapacity generally focuses on the age of the contracting party
(whether the party is a minor),23 or potential impairment of one's mental
capacity to contract. 24
In both instances the right to contract has in the past been lawfully re-
stricted depending on the identity of the individual as a member of a class
or specific qualities of the individual. Those restrictions would seem to im-
ply that the right to contract may not be as fundamental a right as is here
suggested. Nevertheless, even if it is not deemed a fundamental right, the
right to contract should be subject to additional constitutional or statutory
protections because of the discriminatory and arbitrary consequences re-
strictions on that right impose on unauthorized immigrants. This Article
agrees that freedom of contract is subject to some limitation; however, the
general right of an individual to contractually obligate himself and receive
corresponding obligations in return is so pervasive and necessary for our
society as to make it a fundamental right, and as such, to be entitled to a
significantly higher level of protection.
A. Freedom of Contract as "Fundamental"
Most people never consider the importance of the right to contract,
which is essentially the ability to gain and dispose of possessions and ser-
vices, alter legal relationships, and act with some guaranty as to future ob-
ligations and rights.25 It is not until one is faced with the prospect of not
having that right that its value becomes more readily apparent. To be sure,
this article is not arguing for a return to Lochnerian jurisprudence based on a
laissez faire approach to the market in which wage and hour laws, child la-
bor laws, and the like were invalidated as impositions on the "freedom of
contract."26 Rather, the freedom to contract argued for is the basic right of
22. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 235 (9th ed. 2009). "The power to create or enter into a
legal relation. . . the satisfaction of a legal qualification . . . that determines one's ability to ...
enter into a binding contract. . . ." Id.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1979).
24. Id.
25. See HARRY N. SCHEIBER, THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRAcT 3 (1998) (noting that
"[tihe institution of contract has become in modern society the principal instrument for organ-
izing the private marketplace; indeed, it is coextensive with the market in its scope").
26. Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905) (invalidating a New York statute
which limited bakers to 60 hour work weeks as a violation of the "freedom to contract"),
Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (invalidating a New York statute which created
minimum wage for women and minors as a violation of the freedom to contract), overruled in
part by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
56 [Vol. 16
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an individual to enter into agreements that gain or dispose of possessions,
services or otherwise alter legal relationships. As Justice Thompson noted
in 1827, the obligation of contract "springs from a higher source: from those
great principles of universal law, which are binding on societies of men as
well as on individuals." 27
The jurisprudential growth of the right of contract the past three centu-
ries has steadily shifted the focus of common law rights from property to
contract in areas as diverse as real property, personal property, labor, and
legal status.28 Coupled with that growth, governments have faced a contin-
ual tension, especially in the context of labor rights, between employers and
the government with regard to worker protections and wage require-
ments.29 In England, this tension resulted in many worker protection laws
concerning hours, wages and actions30 coexisting with the judicial pro-
nouncement that "[p]ublic policy requires it is that men of full age and
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and
that their contracts . .. shall be held sacred." 31 It is this tension and potential
misnomer of freedom of contract that has troubled legal scholars, philoso-
phers, and economists alike.32 Freedom of contract has, at some times
meant both the ability of the empowered class to economically advantage
themselves through the strength of their superior bargaining position and
the economic insecurities of the working class;3 3 at other times, for example,
during the abolitionist movement, freedom to contract has meant the basic
right of humans to be able to contract and receive benefits for the services
they render.M
The tension most important for this article is that between the right of
27. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 222 (1827).
28. See John v. Orth, Contract and the Common Law, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 62-64 (Harry N. Schreiber, ed., 1998).
29. Id. at 50-56.
30. Id. (citing laws regulating wages for weavers, tailors, silk weaver, hatters, papermak-
ers, vat men, and dry workers).
31. Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, [1875] L.R.Ch. 19 Eq. 462, 465
(Eng.).
32. See James Gordley, Contract, Property and the Will - The Civil Law and Common Law Tra-
dition, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 66-87 (discussing Adam Smith, Jeremy Ben-
tham, Immanuel Kant, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, William Blackstone and Oliver Wendell
Holmes).
33. Lochner, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (arguing that the right to contract is the right for a busi-
ness owner to conduct his business free of government oversight), Morehead, 298 U.S. 587, 611
(1936) (characterizing the New York minimum wage for women and minors as nullification of
contracts between employers and adult women), overruled in part by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313
U.S. 236 (1941)
34. See James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of
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an individual to possess the faculty to contract versus the right of a gov-
ernment to restrict the scope of or even the parties to certain, specified con-
tracts. Illustratively, the difference is the distinction between prohibiting an
employer from contracting with "Sarah" to accept a wage below the mini-
mum and prohibiting "Sarah" from entering into any employment agree-
ment whatsoever. While both types of restrictions have existed in U.S. law
at different times, the difference in their effect on "Sarah" is apparent, and
it is more generally the difference between restrictions based on status and
restrictions based on actions. Restrictions based on actions, especially in the
realm of public safety, have long been seen "as legitimate exercises of gov-
ernment's acknowledged power to curtail freedom of contract in the inter-
ests of health, safety, and public order."35
In the United States, few Supreme Court decisions have engendered as
much controversy as the 1905 decision Lochner v. New York. 36 In Lochner, the
Court invalidated a New York employment law limiting the daily number
of hours a baker could work as unduly favoring one party to the con-
tract."37 The Lochner decision arguably represents the pinnacle of the mod-
em right to contract, free from governmental intrusion.3 8 Neither Justice
Harlan's dissent which critiqued the opinion for failing to adequately con-
sider a state's legitimate interest in the health and safety of its denizens, 39
nor Justice Holmes's criticism of a judicial attempt to mandate laissez faire
policies were sufficient to uphold this specific restriction on contract
rights.40 During the Lochner Era, lasting approximately thirty years, courts
struck down laws if they were perceived as encroaching on economic liber-
ty or private contract rights.
41
In Lochner, as in the employment-based cases that followed, the Court
assumed a near equality of bargaining power and found it anomalous that
one party would be statutorily favored over the other in that situation. 42 As
35. Charles W. McCurdy, The "Liberty ofContract" Regime, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 163 (Harry N. Schreiber, ed., 1998).
36. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
37. Id. at 56. The Court framed the issue as whether the challenged state action was an
"unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right and liberty of the indi-
vidual to contract" and concluded in the affirmative as both the buyer and seller of labor pos-
sessed equal rights to contract. Id.
38. See generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and The Ori-
gins ofFundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003).
39. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 70-74 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
41. See Dan Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory to the Interpretation of State
Constitutions: The Ban on Special Laws in Maryland, 71 MD. L. REV. 411, 413 (2012).
42. See Charles W. McCurdy, The "Liberty of Contract" Regime, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM
OF CONTRAcT 165 (Harry N. Schreiber, ed., 1998) (discussing the "principle of neutrality" and
a judicial preference for avoiding favored treatment for groups or classes of individuals).
58 [Vol. 16
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the Lochner Court put it,
There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of
person or the right of free contract . .. [and] there is no contention
that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and capacity to
men in other trades . . . or that they are not able to assert their
rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the
state, interfering with their independence of judgment and of action.
They are in no sense wards of the state. 3
Here the restriction/ protection of the individual party is framed not
only under the guise of freedom of contract, but also an impingement of the
rights of the protected party to enter into contracts that legislatures might
perceive as disadvantageous or unsafe for that party. While facially neutral,
it is not difficult to see how a playing field free from restrictions primarily
benefits the party with greater bargaining power by allowing them to extort
additional gains without any statutory checks. Throughout the Lochner era,
courts invalidated laws that limited the freedom of contract, including re-
strictions on minimum wage,44 maximum hour requirements, 45 union par-
ticipation, 46 federal child labor laws 47 and the mining industry.48
In Adair v. United States, the Court invalidated a law which would have
prohibited employers from including a provision in their employment con-
tracts prohibiting employees from unionizing. The Court, following
Lochner, held that the "employer and the employee have equality of right,
and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference
with liberty of contract which no government can legally justify in a free
land."49 In both cases, Justice Holmes dissented vigorously.50 Holmes exam-
ined more critically the concept of freedom of contract and stated: "I con-
fess that I think that the right to make contracts at will that has been de-
43. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added).
44. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Ho-
tel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
45. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
46. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
47. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled in part by United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
48. Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invaliding the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act that would have, among other things, established wage, hour and produc-
tion standards).
49. Adair, 208 U.S. at 175.
50. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Adair, 208 U.S. at 190 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). In Adair, Holmes began his dissent noting he thought the statute constitutional,
and "but for the decisions of [his] brethren, [he] should have felt pretty clear about it." Id.
2013] 59
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rived from the word 'liberty' in the [Constitutional] amendments has been
stretched to its extreme by [these] decisions."51 According to Holmes, the
questioned regulation "simply prohibits the more powerful party to exact
certain undertakings, or to .. .unjustly discriminate on certain grounds ...
."52 History ultimately proved Justice Holmes correct on the matter when
the alleged "switch in time"53 brought about the Supreme Court decision in
West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish which ended the Lochner Era and sanctioned
greater regulation and restriction on the freedom of contract.M
Under a Fourteenth Amendment due process framework, the Parrish
Court analyzed the right of a state legislature to enact a minimum wage
law as a question of liberty rather than freedom of contract.55 The protected
interest was the freedom from deprivation of liberty without due process of
law. The Court noted that the liberty interest is "liberty in a social organiza-
tion which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace
the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people . ... subject to the re-
straints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its
subject . . . ."56 The same constraints on deprivation of liberty also apply to
challenges based on freedom of contract.57
Undeniably refuting Lochnerian principles, the Court noted:
[t]here is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as
one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from legis-
lative supervision that wide department of activity which consists
of the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to
provide restrictive safeguards.58
The Parrish decision granted clear power to the authorities to restrict
the freedom of contract in certain circumstances, yet while doing so it also
noted clear limits on restricting the freedom of contract based on status.
The Court noted that arbitrary restraints on the liberty interest of contract
are improper.59 States retain the right to protect an individual from entering
51. Id. at 191.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., William G. Ross, When Did the "Switch in Time" Actually Occur?: Re-
Discovering the Supreme Court's "Forgotten" Decisions of 1936-1937, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1153, 1153-54
(2005).
54. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (validating a federal minimum
wage law for women).
55. "The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty .
West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 581.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 392.
58. Id.
59. Id. "Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint .... " Id. Although the Court also
60 [Vol. 16
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into an improvident contract against his health, safety or welfare-but the
power is for the benefit of the party at risk of harm.60
Likewise, addressing the bargaining power of female employees, the
Court noted they were the lowest paid class, with relatively weak bargain-
ing power, and the "ready victims" of those who would take advantage of
their social and civil status.61 The Court also addressed the economic argu-
ments behind its decision, noting the "exploitation of a class of workers
who are in an unequal [bargaining] position" that renders then uniquely
vulnerable to being denied a living wage, harms their health and well-
being, and creates a burden on society. 62
Expanding the trend of Parrish, the following year the Court decided
United States v. Carolene Products Co., holding that laws affecting ordinary
commerce should not be found unconstitutional unless the laws cannot be
found to rest upon a rational basis. 63 In his famous Footnote 4, Justice Stone
delineated a narrower scope of presumption of constitutionality for laws
"directed at particular religious, or national or racial minorities."61 Fur-
thermore, Justice Stone noted particularly that "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities" requires a more meaningful judicial review when
the prejudice "tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political pro-
cesses ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities ....
Consequently, the constitutional right of freedom of contract passed to
a subset of the freedom of liberty, 66 and with it a due process framework to
assess legislatively imposed restraints on the right to contract. Thus the ten-
sion between freedom of contract and an ability to enter into a contract, in-
sofar as it relates to certain protected classes, crystallized. The Lochnerian
freedom of contract, the freedom that required parties to live with their du-
ly executed contracts however overreaching or disadvantageous to the
weaker party, succumbed to the state's interests in regulating "the evil
where it is most felt" 67 whether based on the amorphous concept of social
noted that "reasonable regulations and prohibitions" are acceptable provided they are in the
greater public interest. Id. A law is not arbitrary and complies with the requirements of due
process when it is shown to "have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and
[is] neither arbitrary nor discriminatory . .. ." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 503 (1934).
60. West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 394.
61. Id. at 398.
62. Id. at 399.
63. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,152 (1938).
64. Id. at 153, n.4 (citation omitted).
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
84 (5th ed. 2007) (identifying the freedom of liberty as the ability to engage in a variety of ac-
tivities, and a freedom that carries constitutional protection when the activities are deemed
fundamental).
67. West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400.
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or societal health or the state's police power.
The general framework then for evaluating economic regulations, being
an issue of freedom of liberty, is to apply a rational basis standard. For cas-
es involving economic regulations that disproportionately affect vulnerable
parties or are arbitrary or discriminatory restraints on their liberty, includ-
ing their freedom of contract, the Court recognized the need for enhanced
scrutiny." Keeping clear the distinction between Parrishesque legitimate re-
strictions on contract and improper restrictions of the ability to contract
provides an appropriate judicial framework with which to examine the law.
This distinction allows courts to strike down discriminatory restrictions on
the right to contract while allowing the government ample authority to con-
tinue to regulate economic activity judged only by rationality. In the case of
arbitrary or discriminatory laws, the stricter level of scrutiny would apply
requiring the state to show a narrowly tailored, compelling governmental
interest for the regulation. 69
Finally, the due process clause continues to protect fundamental rights,
those "rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition,"70 and are "so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."n As the definition
of fundamental right has shifted to penumbraS72 with much of the jurispru-
dence since the 1960s focused on the right to privacy,73 it still appears that
the freedom to contract discussed here, the general right of an individual to
enter into contracts, satisfies the objective requirement of a deeply held
right and liberty.74 As the protected liberty interest is a "rational continuum
... which recognizes ... that certain interests require particularly careful
scrutiny," it cannot be seriously questioned that the freedom to contract is
one of the bedrock foundations of our modern commercial society.75 While
it is true that the Lochner era demonstrated a need for legislative interven-
68. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 153, n.4.
69. Id.
70. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997). In defining a fundamental liberty
interest, the Court has required a "careful description." Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
71. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). At other times the Court has elabo-
rated that the right must be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," so that "neither liberty
nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
72. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-84 (1965) (grounding the right to
privacy in "penumbras" emanating from the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights).
73. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding a privacy right for sexual rela-
tions between consenting adults in their home); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (holding that the
use and purchase of contraceptives falls within the ambit of the constitutionally protected
right to privacy).
74. Restrictions on fundamental rights also require the state to satisfy a strict scrutiny
challenge. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
75. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
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tion in some aspects of contracting, it would be inappropriate to analogize
discrete restrictions for a specific type of contract with the broader prescrip-
tion that would prevent an individual from contractually obligating himself
in nearly any type of contract. While past substantive due process jurispru-
dence "counsels caution and restraint. . . . [I]t does not counsel abandon-
ment . . . ."76
The freedom of contract was imported with the rest of the common law
in the founding of our country, and provided a bedrock on which our socie-
ty was conceived.? At that time, it seems likely that the framers' them-
selves conceived of the freedom of contract as a fundamental right given
the level of commerce in the country, but perhaps only for certain qualified
male individuals. However, as the rights of all individuals have expanded
to equal the rights of the more privileged during the birth of the country,
the inherent fundamentality of the right to contract has likewise grown.
While restrictions of many shapes and sizes are expected on many different
types of contracts, the inherent ability of an individual to contractually ob-
ligate himself and likewise receive the obligation of another has roots that
go back thousands of years, at least for the privileged. Given the broad
scope of authority conveyed by the right to contract which literally extends
from birth to death and even beyond, it is one of the most powerful rights
we possess.78
B. Capacity - Protecting the Incapacitated Party
Societies have long imposed restrictions on an individual's right to con-
tract.79 In that sense, one may appropriately question whether the right to
contract is truly so fundamental as to deny future abridgement. However, a
quick examination of many of these historical restrictions, especially those
based on capacity, reveals a relatively benign doctrine of contract law. Stat-
76. Moore, 431 U.S. at 502-03.
77. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.7 (4th ed. 2004) (noting contract law be-
came the "legal underpinning of a dynamic and expanding free enterprise system."). Legal
historians declared the early years of our country to be "above all else, the years of contract,"
and the "golden age of the law of contract." Id. (citing J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF
FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 18 (1956); L. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 275 (2d ed. 1985)).
78. Among the hundreds of thousands of contracts that one enters in his or her life, some
of the most common and basic are: contracting with a hospital for delivery of a child; arrang-
ing for education for children or oneself; employment; managing one's commercial affairs;
marrying; divorcing; purchasing a home; selling a home; planned giving; and finally making
funeral or crematory arrangements.
79. The traditional grounds for voiding contracts based on incapacity are being under the
legal age of majority or being mentally incapacitated due to mental infirmity or intoxication.
See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:1 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2009).
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utes voiding contracts based on capacity generally do so to protect the in-
dividual perceived as the weaker contracting party due to that party's in-
capacity.80 Though none of the capacity-based restrictions were imposed
invidiously, the remedy is still considered fairly extraordinary as it contra-
venes the general preference for freedom to contract,81 and the law pre-
sumes capacity absent evidence otherwise. 82
Generally, laws protecting the incapacitated party provide that con-
tracts are voidable83 as opposed to void." States made the contracts voida-
ble instead of void to allow the incapacitated party the opportunity to ratify
the contract should that party deem it advisable to do so, while providing
the party the freedom to escape the obligation if the party deemed the con-
tract imprudent.85 The debate on capacity has not been free from challenge.
Arguments against voiding contracts based on capacity have been made
regarding the potential unfairness to the other contracting party as well as
the potential "mixed blessing" of being included in protected class with
limited rights.86
Finally, courts and legislatures have also had the opportunity to strike
at certain classes of contracts that are deemed to be against public policy. 87
In these cases, either the court or policy makers identify types of contracts
80. E.g., Id. at § 12(2) (excluding infants, intoxicated persons, and mentally ill persons
from contracting for lack of capacity); id. cmt. (a) ("Capacity, as here used, means the legal
power which a normal person would have under the same circumstances.") (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 20, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS §18); see also Nagle, infra
note 179, at 458-60 (discussing the impetus for the United States government subordinating the
Native American for his own well-being).
81 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 77, at § 4.2 (noting an individual's ability to contract is
impaired only in "extreme instances").
82. See WILLISTON, supra note 79, at § 9.1.
83. Additional grounds for incapacity still exist in some states such as for spendthrifts
and convicts. See Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 27.1 (2002 ed.).
84 WILLISTON, supra note 79, at 9.5, 9.9, 10.2, 10.3.
85. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 77, at § 4.2 (4th ed. 2004) (noting an individual's ability to
contract is impaired only in "extreme instances").
86. Id.; see also JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 8.1 (6th ed.
2009); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 81 at § 4.3 (citing the New York Court of Appeals):
[A] protracted struggle has been maintained in the courts, on the one hand to
protect infants or minors from their own improvidence and folly, and to save
them from the depredations and frauds practiced upon them by the designing
and unprincipled, and on the other to protect the rights of those dealing with
them in good faith and on the assumption that they could lawfully make con-
tracts.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 78 at § 4.3 (citing Henry v. Root, 33 N.Y. 526, 536 (N.Y. 1865)).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 cmt. b (enumerating the common law ca-
pacity limitations as infants, the insane, intoxicated persons, married women, convicts, spend-
thrifts, aged persons, corporations, and Native Americans); see also WILLISTON, supra note 79, at
§ 9:3 (discussing how legislatures, though varied in the conclusion, have uniformly take con-
trol of age of majority/capacity through statute).
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that are improper for their jurisdiction and prevent their legal enforce-
ment." Historically, contracts void for violating public policy have includ-
ed protective types such as unconscionable agreements or overreaching re-
straints on trade or alienability, 89 as well as more general public policy
grounds such as contract with businesses not registered in the state,90 con-
tracts with an illegal purpose or subject matter,91 or those that regulate a
transaction that the jurisdiction believes should not be allowed, such as for-
profit surrogacy arrangements.92 The jurisprudence of voiding contracts
based on public policy, other than this brief mention, is largely ignored in
this article because the principles involved are inapposite. This article is fo-
cusing on states' attempts to disenfranchise an entire class of individuals
nearly entirely from their right to contract. This type of restriction is much
more comprehensive and debilitating than a broad rule of law applied
across society that focuses only on the content of the contract. Conflating
the two doctrines serves only to confuse the issue and is therefore avoided.
1. The Contractual Incapacity of Minors
Incapacity due to infancy is especially benign for the incapacitated par-
ty as it provides the legal equivalent of a unilateral option for enforcement
at the discretion of the minor involved. This incapacity has existed for cen-
turies in the common law.93 Though the criteria have changed over time
and jurisdiction, the general rule still observed in the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts is that contracts entered into prior to the day preceding the in-
dividual's eighteenth birthday are voidable.94 Apparent age, maturity, in-
tellectual capacity, and waivers are insufficient to remove the incapacity. 95
Likewise, unless otherwise statutorily mandated, neither emancipation nor
marriage removes the incapacity. 96
Like membership in the groups involving status below, membership in
the group of individuals deemed minors is involuntary, arbitrary,97 and
temporarily immutable. Unlike status, the purpose for the contractual inca-
88. E.g., WILLISTON, supra note 79, at §§ 18:10,19:68,61:2,16:22.
89. Id. at § 18:10.
90. Id., at § 19:68.
91. Id., at § 61:2.
92. Id., at § 16:22.
93. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 81, at § 4.4.; WILLISTON, supra note 79, at § 9.1 (noting a
decision from 1292 invalidating a contractual release executed by a minor, and that by the
1400s, incapacity based on infancy had become well established).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACIS § 14 (1981).
95. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, at § 4.3.
96. Id.; WILLISTON, supra note 79, at § 9.4, n. 26, 27.
97. The arbitrariness of the rule is demonstrated by the differing ages of majority across
jurisdictions and spheres. FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, at 4.3.
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pacity is paternalistic in the sense that minors require the assistance of the
legal system to protect them from executing unwise agreements.98 The in-
capacity is not, however, absolute.
Minors can enter into binding contracts for "necessaries,"9 as well as a
few other limited categories. 00 Lord Coke defined necessaries to include:
"necessary meat, drinke, apparel, necessary physicke, and other such ne-
cessaries, and likewise for . . . good teaching or instruction whereby [the
minor] may profit himselfe afterwards."' 0' However, even for necessaries,
the doctrine of incapacity is based on the protection of the supposedly
weaker contracting party. Minors' contractual liability is limited to the fair
value of the necessaries received, and as such is more a quasi-contractual
liability based on theories of unjust enrichment than on contractual obliga-
tions. 102 In any event, this incapacity exists to protect the affected party ra-
ther than to deny the party any fundamental right.
2. Mental Incapacity to Contract
The other principal grounds of incapacity in modern times are based on
one's mental ability to understand the nature and consequences of one's ac-
tions.10 Similar to the incapacity of minors, this incapacity was developed
for the protection of the incapacitated individuals. The Restatement (Se-
cond) of Contracts established similar tests for both incapacity based on
"mental illness or defect" as well as "intoxication."104
In both situations the test is whether the contracting individual was
"unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences
of the transaction," or alternatively, "was unable to act in a reasonable
manner in relation to the transaction." 0 5 The alternative, in case of mental
illness or defect and not intoxication, also includes the qualifier: "and the
other party has reason to know of his condition." 06 Like the doctrine of in-
98. Id.
99. WILLtsrON, supra note 84 at § 9.18.
100. Among the few exceptions to the general rule of incapacity for minors, are the ability
to enlist in the armed forces, a contract to support an illegitimate child, and certain types of
employment. 5 WILLisTON ON CONTRACrS §§ 9.6, 9.8 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1990).
101. E. Coke on Littleton 259 (1628). To some extent, the doctrine of necessaries has been
utilized to bind minors, especially married ones, on the argument that what may not be a nec-
essary for an average minor may very well be for a married individual. Merrick v. Stephens,
337 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. App. 1960) (holding that for a married minor, a lease or purchase of shel-
ter and lodging can become a necessity).
102. WILLISrON, supra note 79, at § 9.18.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CoNTRAcrs §§ 15-16.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at § 15. This language has also been read into the qualification based on intoxica-
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capacity based on age, the doctrine of incapacity based on mental illness or
defect is an attempt to provide individuals suffering from the incapacity the
ability to escape their contractual obligations provided they meet the crite-
ria set forth above.107
In one sense, incapacity based on mental defect is much more difficult
to establish than that of infancy given that while age is easily proven, cogni-
tive understanding is an amorphous concept at best. 08 Courts have strug-
gled with distinctions between comprehension and volition,109 and mental
illnesses that occur sporadically with lucid intervals. 110 Yet, in another
sense, incapacity based on mental illness or defect can include an individu-
al of any age, indeed age may be a principal factor, and could cover volun-
tary actions as well as with intentional intoxication."'
As with infancy-based incapacity, incapacity based on mental illness or
intoxication is not absolute. Necessaries may be legitimately contracted for
regardless of the disability, 112 and furthermore, in cases involving mental
illness or defect, courts are more concerned with the knowledge of the oth-
er contracting party of an individual's defect.113 Courts' focus on the oppos-
ing parties' knowledge of one's mental incapacity reflects the tension be-
tween the protectionist purpose of the doctrine and the freedom of all
parties to contract and enjoy the benefits of their contracts. By focusing on
what the other party to the contract knew of the other's incapacity, courts
appear to be focusing on questions of potential overreaching and fraud ra-
ther than mental incapacity as such.114
tion. WILLISTON, supra note 79, at § 10.10 n. 4 and accompanying text.
107. In addition, individuals who have guardians appointed to represent them are con-
sidered unable to manage their affairs and unable to validly effectuate contracts. See
WILLISTON, supra note 84 at § 10.9.
108. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, at § 4.5 (noting criticism of the cognitive test and the
difficulty of its application even though it has been "almost universally accepted by courts.")
109. See Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg. Corp., 242 N.Y.S.2d 763, 767-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963)
(noting although individuals suffering from manic-depressive psychosis comprehend the na-
ture of their actions, they are compelled by their mental condition to act in ways in which they
otherwise would not).
110. 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 10.8 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1990) (noting diffi-
culties in proving incapacity for individuals afflicted with Alzheimer's disease or similar de-
mentia).
111. Id. But see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.6, n. 11 citing (E. Coke on Littleton
247a (1628) (holding that a "drunkard who is voluntaries daemon ... hath ... no privilege there-
by.")); 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 10.11 (noting courts' ambivalence towards allowing in-
toxicated individuals the ability to utilize their voluntary intoxication as a defense against con-
tract).
112. See WILLISTON, supra note 79, at §§ 9.18, 10.14.
113. Id. at § 10.11.
114. Id. Focusing on the knowledge of the other party erodes the reach of this branch of
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Even with a knowledge qualifier, the doctrine of incapacity clearly ex-
ists to protect individuals from contracts they are unable to comprehend or
avoid because of mental illness or intoxication.115 The doctrine is not puni-
tive or restrictive since it allows for contracts to be voidable rather than
void. 116 In contrast to restrictions based on status which generally utilize an
arbitrary, historically-discriminatory categorization, the restrictions on the
right to contract based on capacity are not so much restrictions as protec-
tions, though some have argued that allowing contractual avoidance based
on incapacity could tend to raise the cost of contracting for some if the op-
posing party were to require additional assurances of ability to contract. 17
C. Status - To What Extent May the Right to Contract Be Lawfully
Limited?
In contrast to beneficent limits imposed on the right to contract by one's
incapacity are those regulations that purport to restrict the right to contract
perniciously, generally based on membership in a demarcated class. The
prototypical example of this type of legislation would be the Black Codes,
which purposefully limited slaves' right to contract.118 The law thus faces
an inherent contradiction since the right to contract has long been subject to
state-imposed limitations. Can a right be both fundamental and subject to a
fairly large amount of arbitrary regulation? Or does the fact that a right is
subject to a significant amount of regulation mandate a finding that the
right is not fundamental? In the case of status-based restrictions on the
right to contract, this article argues that the two propositions can be viewed
disjunctively. Whereas generally applicable, limited restrictions on the abil-
ity to contract have long been accepted, discriminative, highly targeted at-
tempts to disenfranchise a vulnerable population from a broadly held right
to contract and participate in a mercantile society should be subject to legal
limitations.
It is clear that the right to contract is subject to some limitation.
"[N]either property rights nor contract rights are absolute ... Equally fun-
damental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest. . . ."119 Faced with that strong pronouncement from the
Supreme Court, it appears that the ability of a sovereign to regulate the
right to contract is clearly pronounced at least in regard to the "common
interest." History is littered with examples of government intervention as
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at § 13.3.
118. See infra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.
119. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,523 (1934).
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to the right of contract based on status, though a historical review tends to
show the practice as outdated and discriminatory, 120 and finds many courts
seeking legal cover for striking down this type of status-based legislation. 121
What is clear from the following text, however, is that a restriction of
rights based on status has generally enjoyed legal and societal approval. On
their face, none of the laws based on status discussed below existed for any
reason other than to restrict the rights of a vulnerable class of individuals.
In contrast to the laws regarding capacity to contract, laws regarding status
to contract have nearly always been pernicious. The fact that the laws were
malevolent, however, does not necessarily mean they were invalid - at least
under the then-applicable law. The evolution of the right to contract into a
fundamental right, however, is why contemporary laws that attempt the
same type of discriminatory restrictions should be struck down. That is the
crux of the issue we face with the Hammon-Beason Act regarding unau-
thorized immigrants' right to contract.
1. Race and Servitude - Status as Property
Race has long been the field most dominated by discriminatory en-
croachments on the right to contract. The purpose behind the restriction on
the right to contract is clear. By eliminating the ability of an individual to
privately order his affairs, accrue wealth, engage in commerce, or obtain
pay for his labor, those making the rules were able to ensure continued
dominance over the affected group while also reinforcing the societal belief
that the group was less deserving of fundamental rights. Faced with the le-
gal proposition that contract rights are subject to regulation, courts have
sometimes created distinctions without a difference or simply adopted hy-
per-formalistic decisions ignoring the broader question of fundamental
rights.
In that vein, the judicial treatment of race and servitude, two distinct
concepts, has been strongly interconnected since the birth of the United
States. 122 It is difficult to discuss concepts behind restrictive laws based on
race without recognizing the role slavery played or had played at the time
states enacted various restrictions.1 2 Likewise, it is important not to focus
120. See infra Sections II.C.1-4 (discussing laws preventing contract based on gender, race,
or servitude).
121. Greater discussion of the Civil Rights Act and equal protection jurisprudence is
found in Sections III.C and D infra.
122. See Pope, supra note 34, at 1481-91 (discussing the inability of slaves to contract).
123. See Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of Slavery in American Legal Development, in
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too much on the role servitude played, as not all race-based restrictions
were driven by this unique interrelationship. In this section both race and
servitude will be discussed, together where appropriate, separately other-
wise.
Rights restrictions based on servitude have a long history dating from
pre-Renaissance cultures, including, notably, the Roman civil code,124 and
ancient Greek law. In ancient Greek law, freedom of contract was a founda-
tional principle of their society.125
The doctrine of freedom of contract was so strong at Athens that it
was possible to contract out of the protection of the law, or to agree
that a contract should take precedence over law, or to expect a
court of law to uphold a contract which is publicly admitted to
have constituted a conspiracy to commit an unlawful act.126
Even with this strong concept of the legal supremacy of contract, in an-
cient times slaves lacked any rights, including, of course, the right to con-
tract.127
Slaves themselves were generally considered chattel, or res mancipi,128
and as such were freely transferable. The restriction of the right to contract
in Rome was predicated on this notion. Even when the restriction was re-
laxed, it was done only for the interest of the owner, and only then through
the creation of a legal fiction.129
In the territory that became the United States, the concepts of slavery
124. See generally HAROLD BERMAN, The Religious Sources of General Contract Law: An His-
torical Perspective, in FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION 187, 187-
208 (1993) (describing the religious sources behind General Contract Law in Roman emperor
Justinian's sixth century digest); James Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Con-
tract Doctrine (1991) (discussing the rediscovery of Roman law and late-Scholastic philosophy
that bore the first general theory of contract law in the eleventh century in Medieval Europe).
125. Russ VERSTEEG, THE ESSENTIALS OF GREEK AND ROMAN LAW 83 (2010).
126. Id. at 83 (citing S.C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law 72, 263-67 (1993)).
127. VERSTEEG, supra note 125 at 47 (noting that slaves in ancient Athens were deemed
personal property under the law, and as property could not own real property); W. W.
BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. McNAIR, ROMAN LAW & COMMON LAW 23-26 (2nd ed., 1997) (noting
that slaves lacked both rights and duties); see also ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW &
COMPARATIVE LAW 29 (1991) (noting that slaves were prohibited even from the contract of
marriage, and that contracts entered into by slaves bound the other party to the master, but
not the master to the other).
128. Russ VerSteeg, The Roman Law Roots of Copyright, 59 MD. L. REV. 522,544-45 (2000).
129. See Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 28 -29
(2010) (discussing the legal fiction of slaves as chattel and the strict adherence to this legal fic-
tion to deny slaves human civil liberties) (citing Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner's Truth:
Race, Gender, and the Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 311-12 (1996); Walter John-
son, Inconsistency, Contradiction, and Complete Confusion: The Everyday Life of the Law of Slavery,
22 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 405, 422 (1997)).
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and race became generally conflated to the point where to debate one was
to debate the other.o3 0 Under that framework, any law affecting slaves
would automatically and only affect blacks. In addition, states also passed
laws based on race to reach free blacks who would not be subject to the
laws on slavery.131 In both instances, blacks were denied rights based on
status alone (either as a slave or a black person), a situation which was not
legally rectified in large part until the Civil Rights Act of 1964.132
Especially in the south, states and localities acted to create laws and
guidelines to regulate slave-based commerce and those slaves' and free
blacks' interactions with society. 133 Not until the Reconstruction Era
Amendments following the Civil War did the United States outlaw slav-
ery,134 grant citizenship to all persons born in the United States, ensure that
states could not enact laws abrogating the privileges or immunities of U.S.
citizens, ensured due process and equal protection of the laws,135 and guar-
antee the right of a citizen to vote without regard to "race, color, or previ-
ous condition of servitude." 3 6 However, even these facially unambiguous
amendments were insufficient to guard against states' attempts to restrict
the rights of individuals based on race or prior status of servitude, especial-
ly as it relates to the right to contract.
Historically, U.S. slaves could not enter into legally binding contracts,
sue or be sued, hold title to property, or enter into a legally binding mar-
riage.137 Free blacks, who were legally permitted to marry, were denied the
right to contract for marriage if the marriage was with a white woman.138
130. See Finkelman, supra note 120, at 4-5 (noting justifications for slavery in the United
States were generally always predicated on race, and that "[flor Americans, 'race has always
been the central reality of slavery.'") (citing David Brion Davis, Slavery and the American Mind,
in PERSPECTIVES AND IRONY IN AMERICAN SLAVERY 56 (Harry P. Owens, ed., 1976)).
131. See James A. Gillmer, Suing for Freedom: Interracial Sex, Slave Law, and Racial Identity in
the Post-Revolutionary Antebellum South, 82 N.C. L. REV. 535, 580-81 (2004) (describing a series
of laws which targeted free black persons, including forced slavery for defaulting on taxes,
indefinite detention for traveling without emancipation papers, mandates to register with
government officials, and jail sentences for traveling outside of one's county of residence
without "honest employment").
132. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (2012) (ending Jim Crow, segregation, and many overtly racist laws).
133. E.g. XI HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, 1782-84 at 39, 39-40
(William Waller Hening ed., 1823), 1 Collection of Acts of Virginia 260, 268, 445, 581-82. See also
Gillmer, supra note 131, at 580-81.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
135. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
136. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
137. See William W. Fisher III, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, in SLAVERY AND
THE LAW 43,43 (Finkelman, ed. 1997).
138. Id. at 45. In the United States there was always tension in how free blacks were treat-
ed compared to slaves. However, given the strong evangelical influence in the South, judges at
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The North Carolina Supreme Court held "[u]nder our system of law, a
slave can make no contract. . . .He has no legal capacity to make a contract.
He has no legal mind."139 The Alabama Supreme Court concurred, noting
slaves' "absolute civil incapacity" and held them to be "incapable of own-
ing property, or of performing any civil legal act. . . ."140 In that case the Al-
abama Supreme Court noted that Alabama law "recognize[d] no other sta-
tus" than free or slave, and slaves were lawfully incapable of possessing
civil rights and legal capacity. 141
In addition to the numerous legal opinions that restricted or eliminated
the rights of slaves to contract, 142 states had long had "slave codes"143 or
"Black Codes" to regulate the legal rights, liabilities and procedures for
blacks and slaves both before and after the Civil War.144 Following the Civil
War, the Black Codes were either amended or new ones implemented to
ostensibly comply with the Reconstruction Era Amendments while main-
taining blacks in a subservient role.145 The original slave or Black Codes in-
cluded the standard prohibitions on owning property, traveling, working
for pay, or contracting for the purchase or sale of goods. 46
Louisiana's Code Noir prohibited blacks from entering into sales
times relied on biblical statements in determining how this tension should be resolved.
[The slave] is made after the image of the Creator.. . .The owner has acquired
conventional rights to him, but the laws under which he is held as a slave have not
and cannot extinguish his high-born nature nor deprive him of many rights which
are inherent in man.
Ford v. Ford, 26 Tenn. 91, 95-96 (1846) (discussing the standing of slaves to defend a testamen-
tary manumission).
139. Batten v. Faulk, 49 N.C. 233, 234 (1856).
140. Creswell's Executor v. Walker, 37 Ala. 229, *3 (Ala. 1861).
141. Id., at *4.
142. See, e.g., Emerson v. Howland, 8 F. Cas. 634 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816); Girod v. Lewis, 6
Mart. (o.s.) 559 (La. 1819), Abercrombie's Ex'r v. Abercrombie's Heirs, 27 Ala. 494 (Ala. 1855).
143. E.g., 1865 Fla. Laws 2 (prohibited militia service by colored men), 1,466 (prohibiting
colored persons from possessing firearms or knives or attending white religious services); Id..,
at 30 (criminalizing white women to cohabitate with a man who is one-eighth black or great-
er), 1,469 (criminalizing breach of contract when a colored person breaches an employment
contract).
144. DONALD LIVELY, THE CONSTITUTION, RACE, AND RENEWED RELEVANCE OF ORIGINAL
INTENT 44-45 (2008).
145. Joe M. Richardson, Florida Black Codes, 47 FLA. HISTORICAL QUARTERLY 365, 373-76
(1969) (expressly securing the life, liberty, property, and happiness of all Floridians yet relegat-
ing colored Floridians and their rights into a lesser standing).
146. James B. Browning, The North Carolina Black Code, 15 J. NEGRO HISTORY 461, 465
(1930) (voiding marriages between white persons and persons of color and requiring any con-
tract which involved a person of color with a value of ten dollars to be void unless in writing
and signed by both parties as well as a white person who was able to read and write). Louisi-
ana's original Black Code enacted in 1724 and based on the slave code of French Caribbean
colonies was literally titled the "Code Noir." Louisiana Code Noir (1724) § XV, BlackPast.org,
(April 22,2013, 4:45 PM), blackpast.org/?=primary/lousianas-code-noir-1724.
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agreements of any type, and also punished anyone who would purchase
anything from them. 47 The Code Noir further prescribed any ownership of
real or personal property by slaves, and that any real or personal property
acquired by slaves through work, gift, inheritance or otherwise would pass
by law to their masters.'# Even freeborn or freed slaves faced additional
civil incapacitation as the Code Noir voided any testamentary or inter vivos
gift to them and instead directed such gifts to "the benefit of the nearest
hospital." 149
Later Black Codes, unable to focus on the condition of servitude that
permeated prior ones, were unrepentantly clear in purpose even while
granting certain rights. Louisiana's Black Code of 1865 included prohibi-
tions on renting property, as well as Section 8, which prevented any black
person from "sell[ing], barter[ing], or exchang[ing] any articles of mer-
chandise or traffic within said parish without the special written permis-
sion of his employer, specifying the article of sale, barter or traffic. . . ."15o
North Carolina's Black Code also contained peculiar language regarding
the right to contract:
[AIll contracts between any persons whatever, whereof one or
more of them shall be a person of color, for the sale or purchase of
any [domestic farm animal], whatever may be the value of such ar-
ticles, and all contracts between such persons for any other article
or articles of property whatever of the value of ten dollars or more;
and all contracts executed or executory between such persons for
the payment of money of the value of ten dollars or more, shall be
void as to all persons whatever, unless the same be put in writing
and signed by the venders or debtors, and witnessed by a white
person who can read and write. 151
In the Black Codes discussed above, basic rights to contract were se-
verely restricted based explicitly on race and former slave status. These re-
147. Louisiana Code Noir (1724) § XXII, BlackPast.org, (April 22, 2013, 4:45 PM),
blackpast.org/?=primary/lousianas-code-noir-1724.
148. Louisiana Code Noir (1724) §§ XXII, XXIII, BlackPast.org, (April 22, 2013, 4:45 PM),
blackpast.org/?=primary/lousianas-code-noir-1724. See also Gaius Digest 48-55 (discussing the
dependency of slaves to their masters and the power of agency).
149. Louisiana Code Noir (1724) § LIII, BlackPast.org, (April 22, 2013, 4:45 PM),
blackpast.org/?=primary/lousianas-code-noir-1724. This statement is in direct contrast to §
LIV which purported to grant to freed slaves the same rights enjoyed by any free-born person.
Id.
150. Section 8 Louisiana Black Code, 1865, Senate Executive Document No. 2, 39th Con-
gress, 1st Session., p. 93.
151. 1866 N.C. Sess. Laws 101, at § 7 (1866).
2013] 73
23
Weber: Restricting the Freedom of Contract: A Fundamental Prohibition
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
strictions continued in various forms until the Civil Rights Era and the en-
actment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, discussed in Section III.D below.
Even then, it is noteworthy that the mechanism that removed the re-
strictions was legislative rather than judicial, a distinction that has framed
the current debate on contract rights based on status.
2. Gender as Status - An Evolution of Contractual Suffrage
Gender-based impingements, such as race or servitude-based con-
straints, were also used to perpetuate societal power imbalances by dis-
criminatorily limiting the legal rights of women. In the United States, as re-
cently as the early 1900s, married women were deemed to have lost their
legal personhood through civiliter mortua or "civil death" occasioned by the
legal union with their husband. 152 In the nineteenth century, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held in Bradwell v. Illinois that a married woman could not be
an attorney due to her incapacity to contract with a third party. 53 Justice
Bradley in his concurrence went further to note:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. . . . So
firmly fixed was this sentiment in the founders of the common law
that it became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence that a
woman had no legal existence separate from her husband .. .154
States' deprivation of married women's right to contract was judicially
condoned through at least the mid-1900s.s55 In United States v. Yazell,156 the
Supreme Court upheld a Texas law mandating the doctrine of coverture,157
which incapacitated a married woman from contracting away rights to her
separate property without a court decree removing that incapacity.1ss While
the Court noted the institution of coverture existed in only 11 states at the
152. See BAYLES, supra note 20, at 28-29 (citing laws in California, Georgia, New Mexico,
Louisiana, and the Dakotas relegating women to an inferior legal position after marriage).
153. 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
154. Id. at 141. Justice Bradley went on to note, "The paramount destiny and mission of
woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign office of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator." Id.
155. HOMER CLARK JR., THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 8.1, at
503 (2nd ed. 1987); see also Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of Cover-
ture, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 593, 596-600 (1991).
156. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
157. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
158. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
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time and therefore the problem was not a "battle to vindicate the rights of
women,"159 it held that states had substantial latitude to regulate in the are-
nas of family and family-property arrangements. 160 As to the right to con-
tract, the Court warned against "establish[ing] a principle which might cast
doubt upon the effectiveness ... of the laws of 11 other States relating to the
contractual positions of married women" 61 except in in instances "where
clear and substantial interests in the National Government, which cannot
be served consistently with respect for such state interests, will suffer major
damage if the state law is applied."162
Nor is the United States viewpoint unique in scope or type. The com-
mon law as developed in England long treated women as an inferior legal
person in their ability to contract, deal with real property and inheritance
and succession.163 Similarly, the Napoleonic Code in eighteenth century
France prohibited a woman from entering into contracts or otherwise dis-
posing of property.164 This treatment is pervasive and many countries' legal
systems have long been utilized to ensure the deference of women to their
male caretakers be they fathers, brothers, or husbands by denying that the
right to contract is a fundamental right of an individual.
It has not been until recently, notably through Title VII of the Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting gender-based employment discrimina-
tion, 65 and more fully developed case law under the guise of equal protec-
tion,1A6 that these earlier prohibitions on some types of gender-based dis-
crimination have been cast aside, though some contract limitations based
159. Yazell, 382 U.S. at 350.
160. Justice Fortas elaborated that "We have no federal law relating to the protection of
the separate property of married women. We should not here invent one and impose it upon
the States, despite our personal distaste for coverture provisions. . ." Id. at 352-53.
161. Id. at 353.
162. Id. at 352. Justice Black, dissenting in Yazell, provided his opinion on the effect of
coverture, the "common-law fiction that husband and wife are one." Justice Black believed the
institution of coverture meant that after the parties become one in marriage, "the one is the
husband" and the women was subsumed entirely by him. In noting that this point of view had
been "completely discredited," he concluded, " [it seems at least unique to me that this Court
in 1966 should exalt this archaic remnant of a primitive caste system to an honored place
among the laws of the United States." Id. at 361.
163. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 157.
164. Under the Napoleonic Code, prior to any marriage, women were governed by their
fathers, and, upon marriage, their husbands. Both father and husband were entitled to admin-
ister the wife's assets without her consent. See Arlette Gautier, Legal Regulation Of Marital Rela-
tions: An Historical And Comparative Approach, 19 INTL J.L. POLY & FAM. 47, 53 (2005).
165. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2).
166. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (establishing an intermediate level of re-
view for equal protection claims based on gender); U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 564 (1996)
(invalidating the Virginia Military Institute's single-sex matriculation policy).
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on status persist.167 At the constitutional level, equal protection arguments
have been utilized to strike down discriminatory gender-based legislation
using an intermediate level of scrutiny.16 8 Challenges have utilized both a
traditional suspect class analysis,169 as well as distinguishing laws that in-
fringe on "basic" instead of "non-basic" rights in determining the level of
scrutiny to be applied.170 In the latter context, any law attempting to restrict
a "basic" right must be judged using more than a rational basis analysis.171
Additionally, some courts have focused instead on the unreasonable
exercise of power in enacting gender-based legislation.172 The New Jersey
Supreme Court summed up the evolution in gender-based restrictions in
the law noting in closing that "[wihile the law may look to the past for the
lessons it teaches, it must be geared to the present and towards the future if
it is to serve the people in just and proper fashion."173 It is in this context
that judges have been less willing to uphold laws that restrict women's
ability to contract for gainful employment. "Such tender and chivalrous
concern for the well-being of the female half of the adult population cannot
be translated into legal restrictions on employment opportunities for wom-
en."174
167. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a Michigan law forbidding all
women except those who are wives and daughters of tavern owners from working as bar-
maids on equal protection grounds). J. Frankfurter specifically noted, "despite the vast chang-
es in the social and legal position of women," states are still free to "draw[] a sharp line be-
tween the sexes. . ." Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 465-66. Goesaert has faced substantial criticism. See
Paterson Tavern & G.O.A. v. Borough of Hawthorne, 270 A.2d 628, 631 (N.J. 1970) (citing Sei-
denberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (invalidat-
ing practice of not serving female clients)), United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp.
8, 16 (D. Conn. 1968) (invalidating sex-based discriminatory sentencing practices); White v.
Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 408 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (striking down a law preventing females from
serving as jurors).
168. See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. 190.
169. Id.
170. LEO KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 157-59 (1969).
171. Id. See also White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 408 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (invalidating a state
law preventing women from engaging in jury duty which the court characterized as "one of
the basic rights" of citizenship).
172. The Florida and New Jersey Supreme Courts invalidated local laws prohibiting
women from working as bartenders on the grounds that such prohibitions were unreasonable
and went "beyond any public need." Brown v. Foley, 158 Fla. 734, 735-36 (Fla. 1947) (holding a
municipality is only empowered to implement "reasonable ordinances" and there was "no
sound reason in law" to uphold the gender-based employment ordinance); Paterson Tavern &
G.O.A. v. Borough of Hawthorne, 270 A.2d 628, 633 (N.J. 1970).
173. Paterson Tavern & G.O.A., 270 A.2d at 633.
174. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 534 (Cal. 1971).
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3. American Indians- Wards of the United States
The U.S. government's attitude toward its contractual obligations with
American Indians is perhaps the clearest example of government spon-
sored discrimination. Whereas slave ownership was only tolerated and not
practiced by the U.S. government, it did actively participate in creating cer-
tain types of contractual limitations for American Indians that were de-
signed to keep them permanently disadvantaged in their ability to manage
their own affairs. For hundreds of years now American Indians have suf-
fered significant legislative and judicial restrictions on their contractual
rights.175 As a leading treatise notes, "it seems clear that an unemancipated
Indian has only a limited contractual capacity, subject to the control and
approval of the United States, his guardian or trustee. . ."176 Once again, it is
clear that limitations on the right to contract were integral in perpetuating a
legal framework that discriminatorily disempowered a class of individuals
based on an immutable characteristic.
The reasons behind the tribes' limited contractual capacity are various,
and at times entirely discriminatory. The distinction or status used to de-
marcate the group could be said to be predicated on race, national origin, or
political subdivision, though their experience is unique given the centuries
of open, ongoing hostilities between citizens of the United States and the
tribes. Additionally, the law was forced to develop and settle the rights of
the tribes that remained free as well as those who had been defeated and
allotted reservations, groups that faced substantially different legal circum-
stances and who enjoyed considerably different rights.m
From the outset, the United States abused the contractual relationship
between the tribes and them, and many contracts or treaties were simply
ignored almost from the moment of their execution. 178 Additionally, when
American Indians sought legal recourse, they were forced to seek compen-
sation in a forum belonging to the very party who had breached its legal
obligations to them.179 Given the unique relationship and the tribes' status
175. Gerard N. Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 DUKE
L.J. 875, 885-86 (2003).
176. WILLISTON, supra note 79, at § 11.12. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACIS § 12 cmt.
b (noting that American Indians have also been denied certain rights to contract as wards of
the U.S. government).
177. 25 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2006) (collectively "'Indian Law").
178. See, e.g., United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1956)
(noting an attempt by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1908 to transfer from the Yakima tribe
seventy-five percent of the flow of a river intended to be used by them for irrigation in direct
contravention of a treaty from the 1850s).
179. See, e.g., Mary Kathryn Nagle, Standing Bear v. Crook: The Case For Equality Under
Waaxe's Law, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 455, 458 (2012) (noting the United States Attorney's de-
fense in a habeas corpus action that Indians did not have the right to sue in a U.S. court of
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as a domestic dependent nation,180 the United State imposed the legal struc-
ture of guardianship on the American Indians, making themselves the
guardians and trustee of the rights of its wards, the American Indians. 181
Not until 1879 was the American Indian Standing Bear of the Omaha tribe
able to successfully argue in federal court that an American Indian was a
"'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States."182 Yet, 130
years after Standing Bear's trial, the concept of the U.S. government as fi-
duciary of the tribes has endured.
While American Indians have greater rights today and have enjoyed
some judicial success enforcing those rights,183 the tribes still have federally
restricted contractual rights.184 One consequence of their tribal land being
held in trust by the United States185 is that any contract entered into by an
American Indian tribe that would encumber its land for more than seven
years is invalid without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior.186 Addi-
tionally, individual American Indians are also subject to restrictions when
contracting for property held in trust, though they are able to freely con-
tract for private property not subject to trust regulations.187
Alternatively restrictions on tribes' right to contract, specifically
through their status as ward of the United States, have been used to posi-
tively affect the tribes in their contractual relations and act as a paternalistic
mechanism not unlike the doctrine of incapacity discussed above.188 When
the tribes have coupled the status of ward of the United Status with that of
a "domestic dependent nation" with limited sovereign immunity,189 they
have been able to escape ostensibly legitimate contractual obligations.190
law).
180. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 10 (1931).
181. Id. at 558-60.
182. United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 700 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879)
(No. 14,891). Judge Dundy went on to note the American Indians also enjoyed the "inherent
right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white race, and . . . the inalienable right to
'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. . .'" Crook, 25 F. Cas. at 701.
183. See, e.g., Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding Native American
beneficiaries of individual Indian money accounts were entitled to accounting and fiduciary
relationship with the United States government).
184. See 25 U.S.C. § 81(b) (2006).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 76 (4th Ed. 2012).
188. See Section II.C infra.
189. See United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) ("These Indian
nations are exempt from suit without Congressional authorization. It is as though the immuni-
ty which was theirs as sovereigns passed to the United States for their benefit, as their tribal
properties did.")(internal citations omitted); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832),
Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
190. See, e.g., Putnam v. United States, 248 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1957) (cancelling deeds and
leases executed by American Indians without the required governmental approval).
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While there are potential benefits, the history of this status-based restriction
is not benign, 19' and perhaps more importantly, the rationale behind the
implementation of this legal incapacity differs greatly from the purposes
behind the adoption of the legal incapacities discussed in Section II.B
above.
The United States has made full use of its guardian role, including en-
gaging in activities that directly conflict with treaty obligations.192 In regard
to the legal treatment of American Indians, the Ninth Circuit has noted the:
numerous sanctimonious expressions to be found in the acts of
Congress, the statements of public officials, and the opinions of
courts respecting 'the generous and protective spirit which the
United States properly feels toward its Indian wards,' and the 'high
standards of fair dealing' required of the United States in control-
ling Indian affairs', are but demonstrations of a gross national hy-
pocrisy.s93
Since the Indian Acts of the First Congress in 1789,194 the federal gov-
ernment has continually restricted the contract rights of American Indians
individually and the tribes collectively through, inter alia, limitations on
sale of land,195 regulation of trade,196 regulation of allotments,19 7 and trus-
191. See United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District, 236 F.2d 321, 332 n. 18 (9th Cir.
1956) (citing Senator Wheeler, stating "that the Secretary of the Interior and the Indian Bureau
had no right to go ahead and act arbitrarily without the tribal council's consent, taking away
water or land from these Indians and giving it to white settlers.") Congress agreed with Sena-
tor Wheeler's opinion in subsequent legislation acknowledging "'the Indians ... have been
unjustly deprived of the portion of the natural flow of the Yakima River to which they are eq-
uitably entitled. . ."' Id. at 333 (citing The Act of August 1, 1914, ch. 222, 38 Stat. 604); see also
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
192. See Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
193. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d at 338 (internal citations omitted).
194. Act of Aug. 20, 1789, ch. 10, § 1, 1 Stat. 54 (1789) (levying a sum not exceeding $20,000
on imports and tonnage to defray the negotiation and treatment expenses of Indian tribes), Act
of July 22, 1790, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 136 (1790) (further appropriating the import tax to defray the
costs of those who manage Indians), Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (limiting
trade and intercourse with Indians to those with Congressional authority, penalizing those
who defy legislation, forcing forfeiture of all merchandise of those who defy legislation, abro-
gating the right of Indians to convey good title of land without federal authority, punishing
white criminals who commit crimes on tribal lands with crimes of the state or territory sur-
rounding the Indians).
195. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, §4, 1 Stat. 137 (1790).
196. Id. at §1.
197. Act of June 14, 1862, ch. 101, 12 Stat. 427; General Allotment Act, Act of Feb. 8, 1887,
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388; 25 U.S.C.A. § 331 et seq. (repealed by Indian Land Consolidation Act Amds.
of 2000, § 106, 114 Stat 1911).
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teeship of tribal or individual resources. 198 Congressional power in this
realm is so broad that it has been used to dissolve tribes and distribute re-
maining assets in the same fashion as if a company were to be dissolved.199
While federal treatment of American Indians has been steadily improved
from the late 1960s, 200 many of the contractual restrictions discussed above
remain in place. The argument that these restrictions exist for the benefit of
the American Indians is not dissimilar from earlier arguments regarding
the faculties of blacks, slaves or women. 201 As with gender, race and servi-
tude, the law has partially restricted a fundamental right to contract based
on an involuntary characteristic of a group who has suffered substantial
discrimination. In the case of American Indians it is fair to wonder, given
the odd dichotomy of domestic-dependent nations,202 how long their con-
tractual incapacity will continue to exist.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS ON STATUS-BASED
RESTRICTIONS
As mentioned previously, the genesis of this article was the Hammon-
Beason Alabama Taxpayer and Citizenship Protection Act which attempted
to declare void most contracts entered into by unauthorized immigrants, 203
though the analysis applies equally to any status-based restriction ground-
ed on arbitrary or discriminatory grounds. This law provides a class of in-
dividuals upon whom to test theories of valid contract restriction versus
improper status-based restrictions. The identity of this group, individuals
subject to U.S. immigration law, adds the additional ground of preemption
for invalidating the statute that may not be open to many other groups.
It is useful to examine what the law in fact prohibited in its original
form regarding contractual restrictions, especially for purposes of deter-
mining due process and/or civil rights violations. As mentioned above, on
the civil side, the law prohibited the enforcement of any contract with an
unauthorized immigrant if the other party, at the time of contracting, had
198. Congress, as trustee, has nearly plenary power to regulate tribal resources including
both land and money. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 75 (2002) (citing
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977)).
199. Id.
200. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 12-13 (2002).
201. The comparison is imperfect, however, given the unique legal position of American
Indians as both sovereign and dependent.
202. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 47 (1831). In Cherokee Nation, Chief
Justice Marshall established the unique clarification of the tribes as both sovereign and de-
pendent on the U.S. government. Id. The U.S. government's continued vision of its relationship
to the tribes as that of a benefactor over its ward suggests that the tribes may not obtain full
contractual freedom for some time to come. See supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text.
203. ALA. CODE § 31-13-2 (Lexis Nexis Supp. 2012) (Legislative Findings).
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direct or constructive knowledge of the party's unauthorized immigration
status, and the contract either required the unauthorized immigrant to re-
main in the country more than twenty-four hours after execution of the
contract or performance could not be expected to occur without the unau-
thorized immigrant remaining in the country. 204 Presumably, a contract be-
tween an unauthorized immigrant and his or her attorney in nearly any
type of proceeding or legal matter would have run afoul of this prescrip-
tion.205
On the state side, the law prohibited an unauthorized immigrant for
entering or attempting to enter into any business transaction 206 with the
state or a political subdivision of the state, classifying this action as a Class
C felony.207 As the state of Alabama has public cooperatives for industries
such as electricity and water, the statute, read broadly in its original form,
could easily have been construed to invalidate any contract by the state or
its agents for those necessary services, and that is the subject of our next
section.208
A. Contract Clause
This Article initially envisioned a spirited discussion on the Hammon-
Beason Act on Contract Clause grounds given the broad text of the initial
law. 209 However, the law has now been amended several times due in no
small party to vigorous challenges it has faced in the courts. 210 The result of
204. ALA. CODE § 31-13-26 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). The law specifically excluded con-
tracts: for lodging for one night; to purchase food to be consumed by the undocumented im-
migrant; for medical services; or for transportation for the undocumented immigrant to return
to his or her home country. Id.
205. Alabama's governor has since signed into law language which narrowed the scope
of "business transaction" to "Public Records Transactions", meaning drivers' licenses, license
plates, ID cards, and business licenses. Summary of HB 56 as Amended by 658, FEDERATION FOR
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM (FAIR), (June 13, 2012), http://www.fairus.org/
DocServer/HB56SummaryAmended.pdf.
206. ALA. CODE § 31-13-29 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012), as amended by HB 658. The statute
provides a non-exhaustive list of "Record transactions" that includes motor vehicle registra-
tion, driver's license or identification, or business licenses. It also excludes specifically mar-
riage licenses. Id.
207. Id.
208. See ALA. CODE § 31-13-29(d) (creating a class C felony for any unlawfully present al-
ien who attempts to enter into a Records Transaction with a public entity of Alabama).
209. ALA. CODE § 31-13-26(a)(2011).
210. Several months following the expansion of the preliminary injunction, Alabama
amended the law to apply only to contracts entered subsequent to the enactment of the law to
purposefully diffuse any Contract Clause claims, as well as additional modifications aimed at
existing legal challenges. See HB 658, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012); see also United States v.
Alabama, 611 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012); Hispanic Interest Coalition of Ala. v. Governor of
Ala., 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012).
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those amendments and challenges is that key provisions of the law that at-
tempted to invalidate executed contracts no longer exist. However, any ar-
ticle discussing the fundamentality of the right to contract must make at
least passing mention of the relevance of the Contract Clause. The so-called
Contract Clause does not provide an unqualified freedom to contract; ra-
ther it prohibits states from retroactively vitiating existing private contract
rights.211 The exact language of the clause is "No State shall ... pass any ...
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . ."212 While at one time a signif-
icant limit on state regulation,213 it has since lost much of its prominence, 214
and its influence has waxed and waned even in more recent times.215 By
limiting the applicability of the clause to extant rather than prospective con-
tracts and creating additional exceptions to coverage, the Court has greatly
limited the scope of the Contract Clause and its power.
The original provision of Alabama's law that restricted the right to con-
tract between private parties likely would have been partially prohibited by
the Contract Clause. The original language of the statute prohibited the en-
forcement of any contract if one party had direct or constructive knowledge
of the other's unlawful presence 216 as there was no limiting language in the
statute regarding when the contract was executed. As such, the law could
have governed both existing and prospective contracts. If that were the
case, it would have directly violated the prohibition on the impairment of
contractual obligations under the Contract Clause as well as its corollary in
the Alabama Constitution.217
211. U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
212. Id. The Contract Clause is not literally interpreted given the potential scope of cover-
age. Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934) (holding the Contract
Clause prohibition is "not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula").
213. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (striking down a state law pur-
porting to annul a previous land grant and simultaneously establishing the propriety of Con-
tract Clause jurisprudence even in public contracts), Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 122 (1819), Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 623 (1870) (identifying the Con-
tract Clause as the "most valuable provision of the Constitution . .").
214. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (noting "the Contract
Clause receded into comparative desuetude with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
.. ."); Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (resisting a Contract Clause
challenge to a state law that allowed courts to extend foreclosed properties' redemption peri-
ods); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703
(1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 890 (1987);
215. See, e.g., El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (upholding a Texas law that limited
certain contractual rights to reinstate an ownership interest in property); see also James W. Ely
Jr., Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause, 4 CHARLESrON L. REV. 371, 372 (2010) (noting Con-
tract Clause jurisprudence "virtually drop[ped] off the constitutional map"); c.f. Allied Struc-
tural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (invalidating a Minnesota law that would have
imposed additional financial charges on a companies' pension-funding obligations).
216. ALA. CODE § 3 1 -13 -2 6(a) et seq. (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
217. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 22 (1901). Alabama's Supreme Court has interpreted the Ala-
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Applied retroactively, Alabama's law would likely have clearly and
substantially impaired the parties' contract rights in violation of the Con-
tract Clause.218 As such, the impairment could only have been upheld if the
state were able to show a "significant and legitimate public purpose" for
the law, and that the impairment was based "upon reasonable conditions
and [was] of a character appropriate to the public purpose." 219 Those im-
pairments that have been recognized as legitimate have been to prevent
widespread abuse of contracts and foreclosures,220 and to protect consum-
ers from economic harm based on the deregulation of markets.221
In contrast to those previous decisions, Alabama's law initially sought
to revoke the long-standing freedom to contract from a discrete section of
the population based on a discriminatory intent coupled with the bare re-
cital of generalized economic harm and lawlessness. Furthermore, the law
would also have impaired the right to contract of any lawfully present in-
dividual who knowingly contracted with an unauthorized immigrant.222 In
that sense, the law potentially would have harmed to a greater degree those
individuals lawfully present in the United States by abridging their contrac-
tual rights even when they have not engaged in any unlawful conduct.
Even though much of the Contract Clause analysis may be foreclosed
given Alabama's recent decision to amend the law to prevent retroactive
application and the recent Eleventh Circuit decisions regarding the law,m
the amendment indicates the extent of Alabama's concern over a potential
Contract Clause challenge. The case should sound a clear warning bell to
other states who may be considering similar, retroactively-applied legisla-
tion on the right to contract.
B. Preemption
Preemption law in the field of immigration generally focuses on the
question of whether the state statute is a "regulation of immigration, which
is essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into
the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may re-
bama Contract Clause as similar to the Contract Clause in the U.S. Constitution. See Jefferson
County Com'n v. Edwards, 32 So.3d 572, 588 (Ala. 2009) (referring to the two, without distinc-
tion, as the "Contract Clauses").
218. See Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 245 (noting the Framers' intent to protect private
contracts and allow parties to rely on their contractual rights and obligations).
219. Id. at 234-235.
220. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 290 U.S. at 465.
221. Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 416-17.
222. ALA. CODE § 31-13-2 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
223.United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012); Hispanic Interest Coalition
of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012).
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main." 224 State statutes which are found to regulate immigration are im-
permissible encroachments and are invalidated as preempted by federal
law. The Hammon-Beason Act, though on its face not regulating immigra-
tion in the sense of providing work authorization or visas, purports to
regulate the right of contract which in turn limits where people may live,
what they may eat, and how they transport themselves within the state. By
prohibiting this fundamental right, the state is attempting to indirectly con-
trol which populations may reside in their state based on immigration sta-
tus. This decision by a state on who may reside in their states impermissible
infringes on federal immigration law.
Even with the recent amendments attempting to reduce the scope of
the law, the general prohibitions in the Hammon-Beason Act against pri-
vate and public contracts impermissibly and fundamentally alter the com-
prehensive immigration structure contravening the holdings in De Canas v.
Bica225 and Toll v. Moreno.226 Alabama, by restricting the fundamental right
to contract for the entire class of unauthorized immigrants in the state, has
substantially changed the legal position of these individuals far beyond an-
ything envisaged by Congress.227 The change, discriminatory on its face and
acknowledged as such, would create a perpetual second-class of individual
under the law with a limitation of rights akin to those suffered by former
slaves and blacks from the formation of the country through the Civil
Rights Era.228
Under the preemption framework discussed below, Alabama's law fac-
es significant hurdles. As originally drafted, the law's restrictions on the
ability to contract, especially for essentials such as housing, water and elec-
tricity on possible penalty of criminal prosecution 229 appear to be an im-
proper attempt to dictate who shall remain in the country, and under what
conditions. Hines v. Davidowitz specifically counseled against enacting legis-
lation that imposed "distinct, unusual, and extraordinary burdens" on im-
migrants or "singl[ing] [them] out for the imposition of discriminatory
burdens." 230 De Canas v. Bica went further and provided a clear statement
on the scope of permissible action noting, states "can neither add to nor
224. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
225. Id.
226. 458 U.S. 1, 14 (1982) (striking down a state statute based solely on the individual
immigration status as an "ancillary 'burden not contemplated by Congress'").
227. United States v. Alabama, 443 Fed. App'x 411 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Ala-
bama, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012).
228. See Pope, supra note 34, at 1481-91 (discussing the inability for slaves to enforce con-
tracts).
229. Violations of the restrictions on entering into a business transaction with a public en-
tity are classified as felonies. ALA. CODE § 31-13-29 et seq. (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
230. 312 U.S. at 65-66, 69.
84 [Vol. 16
34
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol16/iss1/2
Restricting the Freedom of Contract
take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress ... [on the] resi-
dence of aliens in the United States or several states."231
As mentioned above, Alabama, with regard only to contracts with state
or local governments, had argued for a restrictive interpretation of the
phrase "business transaction," so as to not include court filing fees or prop-
erty tax payments.232 Were the law to include these transactions, the results
would be readily apparent: unauthorized immigrants would be denied ac-
cess to courts and, in conjunction with the restriction on private housing
contracts, would not be able to secure housing other than on a one-night
contract.233 Furthermore, by attempting to criminalize these very actions,
Alabama is attempting to criminalize unauthorized presence which, by it-
self, is not a crime under federal law.m Alabama, by arguably preventing a
populace from contracting for necessities (other than food which was spe-
cifically exempted) and coupling that prohibition with potential criminal
penalties, moved beyond permissible legislation that affects immigrants, to
a greater, impermissible regulation on immigration itself in its desire to in-
crease self-deportation.235
It appears that Alabama has gone beyond enacting laws that affect im-
migrants to enacting a law that directly questions their ability to remain in
the state. Under current federal law, preemption occurs in two distinct sce-
narios: either express preemption when the Constitution or a federal statute
directly conflicts with state law,u 6 or implied preemption when either the
federal influence is so extensive as to exclusively occupy the sphere of regu-
lation 7 or the state law presents an obstacle to compliance with federal re-
quirements.2 8 The preemption doctrine carries greater force in the immi-
231. 424 U.S. at 357 n. 6 (emphasis added).
232. See Ala. Att'y Gen. Guidance 2011-02, at 1 (Dec. 2, 2001), available at
http://www.ago.state.al.us/Page-mmigration (last visited July 3, 2012) (stating that this sec-
tion would not include governmental-provided services such as "water, sewer, power, sanita-
tion, food, and healthcare" on the argued basis of ejusdem generis. The guidance also states that
the section would not apply to prevent access to Alabama courts). Alabama recently amended
the statute to incorporate the restrictive interpretation. See supra note 202.
233. The United States's amended brief referred to the collective prohibitions as "legislat-
ed homelessness." Brief of Petitioner-Plaintiff at 4, United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d
1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
234. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2505 (2012) ("As a general rule, it is not a crime
for a removable alien to remain present in the United States.").
235. ALA. CODE § 31-13-2 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (noting the state's interest in "discour-
age[ing] illegal immigration"). As the Fifth Circuit noted in Moreau v. Oppenheim, unlawful
presence does not bar immigrants access to the court system or permit their contracts to be
treated as void. 663 F.2d 1300,1307-08 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981).
236. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1982) (providing that Congress can ex-
plicitly provide for preemption of state laws).
237. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding that Congress can
exclusively occupy certain legal fields).
238. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (defining conflict preemption as, inter
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gration context given the Court's longstanding recognition of Congress'
plenary power in the field. 239
Congress's plenary power over immigration matters does not mean
states are prohibited from enacting legislation that may regulate immi-
grants in some fashion, but rather that they are limited as to what type of
law they may enact. 240 In recent years for example, states and localities have
had some success enacting legislation requiring employees to provide and
employers to verify proof of work authorization, or face the potential loss
of a business license,241 or to provide instate tuition benefits to unauthor-
ized immigrants based on the locale of their high school rather than immi-
gration status. 242
However, even with these limited inroads into the realm of immigra-
tion-related regulations, states continue to face substantial hurdles to regu-
late immigration. In 2012, the Supreme Court enjoined three of the four
challenged provisions of Arizona's expansive anti-immigrant law S.B. 1070
on preemption grounds, and left the door open to future challenge on the
fourth provision depending on Arizona's implementation of the provi-
sion.243 The Arizona decision strongly bolsters the Eleventh Circuit's deci-
sion to temporarily enjoin Alabama's enforcement of the anti-contract pro-
visions in its law on preemption grounds.244
Although basing its arguments on the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 245 in Plyler v. Doe the Supreme Court invalidated a
alia, "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress").
239. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 585 (1889) (stating that the
power to naturalize is a sovereign power restricted only by the constitution); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (noting that inherent in sovereignty is the right of a na-
tion to restrict the entrance of foreigners); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) (noting the
national role of immigration); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2505 (2012) (holding "the
federal power to determine immigration policy is well settled," and this power is "an inherent
attribute of sovereignty . . .").
240. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (upholding the Arizona
statute mandating use of an electronic work authorization system); De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355
(holding that simply enacting a statute directed at immigrants does not necessarily imply the
statute regulates immigration).
241. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1968; Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., No. 4:07CV00881 2008
WL 294294 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (upholding local ordinance requiring verification of em-
ployees' work authorization against preemption challenge), affd 567 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2009).
242. Martinez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010).
243. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497-2504, 2510 (detailing the federal/state preemption frame-
work, and finding the challenged provisions impermissible encroachments on the federal gov-
ernment's power to regulate immigration).
244. Alabama, 443 Fed. App'x at 417 (11th Cir. 2011); as amended by Order enjoining Ala-
bama's enforcement of Sections 27 and 30 of HB 56, United States v. Alabama, No. 11-14532-
CC (11th Cir., Mar. 8, 2012).
245. See Section III.C. infra.
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state law that would have prevented unauthorized immigrant children
from attending public schools.246 The Court noted that the law, if upheld,
would create "a permanent caste of unauthorized resident aliens, encour-
aged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless
denied the benefits [of] our society. . . ."247 In that sense, the consequence of
restricting the right to contract would likely have similar effect by remov-
ing nearly every commercial transaction from legal sanction and thereby
dramatically reducing the ability of unauthorized immigrants to lawfully
participate in commerce or society.
In this case, the Hammon-Beason Act goes beyond the type of legisla-
tion that has been found permissible because of the primacy of the right to
contract. Restricting the right to contract does not deal with the issues of
work authorization or in-state tuition benefits, issues that are ancillary to
presence. Rather, the law directly prohibits individuals from engaging in
conduct necessary to their continued survival and existence in the state, es-
pecially as to the internationally recognized right to housing. 248 There can
be no question that a statute prohibiting the right of an individual to con-
tract for habitation deals directly with the underlying question of presence
within the state. Therefore, state laws which purport to deny immigrants
their necessities also unavoidably regulate immigration in violation of the
preemption doctrine.
246. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). In Plyler, the Supreme Court invalidated a
Texas law withholding state funds for the education of unauthorized immigrant children. Id.
The Court expressly held that unauthorized immigrants were not a protected class that would
trigger strict scrutiny, but a law burdening them requires more than a rational basis review.
Plyer requires such a law to "further[] some substantial goal of the state." Id. at 224. There is
academic disagreement over the nomenclature of the standard of review actually applied by
the Court in this case. See, e.g., Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 Fordham L.
Rev. 887, 889-90 (2012) (discussing whether the standard of review in a line of equal protection
cases should be characterized "rational basis with bite").
247. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218-19.
248. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(111) A at Art. 25 (Dec. 10,
1948); Article 11(1), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966); International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination G.A. Res. 2106 (XX) at Art. 5(c), U.N. DOC
A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965); and Paragraphs 8-9, Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements and
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C. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
1. Substantive Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause protects against the
deprivation of life, liberty or property without the due process of law. 249 As
Justice Peckham noted in his unanimous opinion in Allgeyer v. State of Loui-
siana, the "liberty" interest protected is not:
only the right of the citizen to be free from . .. physical restraint ...
but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free
in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to use them in all lawful ways;
to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to
enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to
his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above men-
tioned.250
As noted in Section II.A. above, however, the Supreme Court eventual-
ly subsumed the explicit freedom of contract within the more general due
process framework, giving states more latitude to curtail economic regula-
tions subject to constraints on fundamental rights, arbitrariness or discrimi-
nation.251 Under a due process analysis, if only economic or social regula-
tions are involved, courts will use the traditional rational basis analysis
where the laws or regulations are presumed valid, and thus will be upheld
if they bear a rational relationship to the end sought.252 In cases where
courts elect to apply the rational basis standard to a challenged law, they
249. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause provide protection against infringing state action. In this case, Alabama affirmatively
passed a law prohibiting the right to contract with both the state as well as private parties. As
the Court has noted, "state action in violation of the [Fourteenth] Amendment's provision is
equally repugnant to the constitutional commands whether directed by state statute or [a judi-
cial official]." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 16 (1948); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880) (invalidating racially discriminatory state law regarding jury selection).
250. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (emphasis added) (striking down Lou-
isiana's law which prohibiting insurance contract with companies who were not licensed un-
der Louisiana law). Although the language of the Allgeyer decision refers to "citizen," the due
process clause applies equally to all individuals within states' jurisdiction, and as such even
unauthorized immigrants are protected by it. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
251. See supra Section II.A and accompanying text; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537
(1934). If an economic regulation were to be retroactively applied, however, the Court would
be more willing to apply strict scrutiny. See Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
252. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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nearly always uphold the law. 253
Avoiding rational basis analysis is therefore one of the primary goals of
any challenge to a law based on the freedom of contract. If the general right
to contract is classified as fundamental, any encroachments on that right
must pass a higher level of review. When fundamental rights are affected
or the challenged regulation is arbitrary or discriminatory, a strict scrutiny
test is used and the laws or regulations will be held invalid unless they are
necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly
tailored to do so, a much more difficult test. Whereas laws reviewed on a
rational basis are nearly always upheld, laws examined with strict scrutiny
are nearly always struck down. The question of whether the freedom to
contract is a fundamental right may be dispositive in the case. Assuming
the general right to contract is a fundamental right, any prohibition on it,
especially like the one in Alabama's law, is likely to face strict scrutiny giv-
en its alleged discriminatory intent 5 and be invalidated.
In this case the questioned right is the individual's freedom to contract,
meaning the individual's general ability to obligate himself and receive ob-
ligations in return from another. Several factors point to the conclusion that
the freedom to contract described here is a fundamental right. First, the
freedom to contract was a prime component of the common law legal sys-
tem upon which our country was founded, making the right "deeply root-
ed in this Nation's history and tradition."256 Second, the broad scope and
usage of the general freedom to contract in our society strongly suggests
that the right is perceived as a universal or fundamental right by all mem-
bers of our society. Third, the general freedom to contract is intimately
connected to several other fundamental rights including among others the
right to contract for marriage,257 private education,258 and presumably the
right to purchase and use contraceptive devices. 259 Any law abrogating the
general right to contract will necessarily infringe on these previously rec-
ognized fundamental rights. Finally, based solely on pragmatism, an ad-
vanced commercial society could not be sustained without the ability to
contract for future obligations and rights.
253. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §
18.3(b) (4th ed. 2007) (stating that prior to 1976 virtually any statute subject to rational basis
scrutiny would survey challenge, and even thereafter the Supreme Court has shown a strong
preference to uphold challenged laws "unless no reasonably conceivable set of facts" estab-
lishes the nexus between rationality and purpose).
254. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
255. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
256. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
257. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
258. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
259. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
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Even if the generalized right to contract is not deemed fundamental,
Alabama's law should be invalidated on due process grounds given its
purposeful adverse impact on "discrete and insular minorities," 260 thereby
triggering strict scrutiny.261 In Sugarman v. Dougall,262 a case involving an
equal protection claim, the Court stated that "aliens as a class are a prime
example of a discrete and insular minority." 263 Additionally, immigrants,
unless they have naturalized, are unable to vote and are therefore unable to
avail themselves "of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities . . . ."264 Although discussed more fully in Section III.C.2
below, it would appear that the Alabama law clearly targets a minority
group that has no recourse to the political process and that has traditionally
been discriminated against.265
Regardless of whether the general right to contract is found to be a
fundamental right, Alabama's law has both a discriminatory intent and im-
pact. Therefore, under the due process standard, Alabama would need to
show a compelling state interest and that the law is narrowly tailored to
address that interest. The connection between the state interest in reducing
unauthorized immigration and restricting an individual's right to contract
seems tenuous at best. It is difficult to see how voiding a contract for the
sale of goods between an unauthorized immigrant and a U.S. citizen, to the
detriment of both, does anything other than tangentially discourage unau-
thorized presence.
2. Equal Protection
Whereas substantive due process analysis typically requires a funda-
mental right for its protections to apply, the equal protection clause makes
no such distinction. 266 Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protec-
tion clause prohibits states from arbitrarily or discriminatorily treating in-
dividuals differently. 267 As with due process decisions, equal protection ju-
risprudence has developed differing levels of scrutiny depending on the
class of individuals being regulated. For protected or suspect classes, state
action will be subjected to a strict scrutiny standard requiring the state to
show a compelling state interest is furthered by the contested law, and that
260. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
261. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
262. 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973).
263. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See infra Section III.C.2 discussing equal pro-
tection claims based on alienage.
264. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4
265. See infra Section III.C.2.
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the law is narrowly tailored to obtain that result.268 For classes of individu-
als that are not considered suspect, rational basis scrutiny will be applied
and the law will be upheld so long as it is "reasonably related" to a "legiti-
mate" government interest.269 Admittedly, an equal protection claim
against the Alabama law will be difficult to frame as the Supreme Court has
held that "unauthorized status" is not a protected class,270 and would there-
fore be subject only to the rational basis test.
However, as noted in Section III.D below discussing the Civil Rights
Acts, it is not difficult to analyze Alabama's law as legislating against a pro-
tected class on the basis of race or alienage. 271 Additionally, the scope of the
equal protection clause is broader in some respect than the Civil Rights
Acts as classifications based on national origin are also considered sus-
pect.272 Though it is not a large step to find that legislation restricting the
rights of unauthorized immigrants to contract is simply using immigrant
status as a proxy for race,273 national origin or alienage, it is a step. The in-
ferences involved, though, are all reasonable, especially in the context of
Alabama. First, legislative history underscores the fact that the population
targeted by the Hammon-Beason Act was nearly entirely Latino, and more
specifically, Mexican-born. 274 Second, the Hammon-Beason Act only affects
individuals born abroad thus utilizing national origin as a fundamental el-
ement of the law. Third, while the law may be over-inclusive in a sense,275 it
was clearly designed to purge a specific segment of the population from the
state.276 Taking these inferences together, it is eminently reasonable to con-
clude that immigration status in the Hammon-Beason Act was a euphe-
mism for race, national origin, or alienage.
268. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (requiring strict scrutiny analysis
for equal protection claims based on suspect classes).
269. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993) (holding that classifications that
involve neither fundamental rights nor suspect classes are subject only to a rational basis re-
view).
270. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) ("Of course, undocumented status is not irrel-
evant to any proper legislative goal. Nor is undocumented status an absolutely immutable
characteristic since it is the product of conscious, indeed unlawful, action.").
271. See supra Section II.B.
272. Given the level of overlap among the three classes, the difficulty already identified in
delineating them, and the fact that it is unnecessary to do so as any of the three would suffice,
this Section of the article addresses the three claims jointly.
273. See infra note 326 and accompanying text (noting that artificial distinctions as proxies
for a protected class will be subject to strict scrutiny).
274. See infra notes 286, 322 and accompanying text.
275. See Gustavo Valdes & Catherine E. Shoichet, Auto Exec's Arrest a New Flashpoint in
Alabama's Immigration Debate, CNN, http.//www.cnn.com/2O11/l1/22/us/alabama-ininigration-
arrest/index.html (Nov. 22, 2011) (detailing the arrest by Alabama police of a German Mercedes-
Benz executive for failure to possess required documents).
276. See infra note 284 and accompanying text.
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One problem that could arise under an equal protection claim based on
that logical step is that the law is not discriminatory on its face based on
race, national origin, or alienage. The Court has noted that equal protection
challenges require not just disparate impact, but actual discriminatory in-
tent,277 though intent may be inferred through evidence of the disparate
impact 278 or the law's application. 279 In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Corp.,280 the Court elaborated on the factors of discriminatory in-
tent and noted that it could be found from disparate impact, a pattern of
discriminatory government behavior preceding the enactment of the law,
the historical background of the enactment of the law especially as it relates
to the racial animus, and the degree of departure from normal operations
either procedurally or substantively. 281 When discussing impact, the courts
are ultimately engaged in a searching examination that asks whether the
allegedly unprotected classifications were used as false proxies for catego-
ries otherwise eligible for stricter scrutiny.
Hearing a preliminary injunction claim on a fair housing challenge to
Alabama's law, the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama stated
the law is likely entirely "discriminatorily based," and that the legislative
record for the law was "laced with derogatory comments about Hispan-
ics." 282 That court also noted the law "is a substantive departure from the
State's typical treatment . . . [and] in other words, the court has serious
doubts that children-and, in particular, children who are actually citizens of
this National-who are of a different hue, race and nationality would have
been treated so adversely." 283
In Alabama, approximately 65% of immigrants are of Hispanic or Lati-
no origin, and the legislative debates focused almost solely on them.284 In-
sofar as a law purports to regulate unauthorized immigrants in Alabama, it
is truly regulating Hispanics and/or Latinos, and then only those born
277. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that disproportionate impact
alone will not trigger strict scrutiny); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977).
278. Washington, 426 U.S. at 241 (noting that the discriminatory purpose need not appear
in the text of the statute, and that "a law's disproportionate impact is [not] irrelevant"). "Nec-
essarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the
relevant facts, including [disparate impact]." Id.
279. See, e.g. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
280. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
281. Id. at 267.
282. Central Alabama Fair Housing Center v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1193 (M.D.
Ala. 2011).
283. Id. at 1191.
284. Id. at 1192 (noting "the use, in legislative debates, of illegal immigrant as a code for
Latino or Hispanic, with the result that, while addressing illegal immigrants was the target,
discriminating against Latinos was the target as well.").
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abroad.285 Indeed, legislative comments conclusively show an overarching
emphasis on Hispanics and Hispanic ethnic stereotypes, with on the record
comments about "4-foot Mexicans in there catching them chickens" and
seeing "30 of them [illegals] get out of a car one day. .. I thought it was a
circus."286 Furthermore, prior to the enactment of the law, various segments
of Alabama's state and local governments were already vociferous in their
intent to create a hostile living environment for these individuals,287 and the
law itself was passed with the specific purpose of encouraging attrition
through enforcement.2s
To the extent that the Alabama law is seen as impermissibly utilizing
immigration status as a proxy for race, national origin or alienage, it should
be invalidated on equal protection grounds under a strict scrutiny analysis.
The Alabama law seems to satisfy every criteria established in Arlington
Heights in determining improper race-based classifications, and accordingly
should be subjected to strict scrutiny.289 If a court were to decline to impose
strict scrutiny in this case, it is difficult to imagine any other set of facts ever
satisfying the Arlington Heights test.290
D. Civil Rights Acts
The various Civil Rights Acts (1866, 1870, 1964, 1991)291 provide signifi-
285. Both the author and coauthor of Alabama's law were asked for evidence of the
growth in unauthorized immigration, and both responded only with evidence of growth in the
Hispanic population (authorized and unauthorized). Tim Lockette, Biggest Whoppers of 2011...
and One that Turned out to be True, THE ANNISTON STAR (Dec. 29, 2011),
http://toww.bamafactcheck.com/view/fullstory/16926998/article-Biggest-Whoppers-of-2011--and-one-
that-turned-out-to-be-true. See also Ed Pilkington, Human Rights Watch Accuses Alabama of Violat-
ing Constitution, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 14, 2011 (noting Alabama's "all-out assault on undocu-
mented Hispanic people").
286. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 1191.
287. See Paul Reyes, Help Not Wanted: What Happens When Outside Agitators Work with State
Politicians to Pass the Nation's Most Draconian Anti-immigration Law Yet?, MOTHER JONES, March
1, 2012 at 24 (detailing numerous unsubstantiated claims made by the Alabama law's authors
prior to enactment of the law as to the economic cost and the magnitude of unauthorized im-
migration in the state).
288. See ALA. CODE § 31-13-2 et seq. (Lexis Nexis Supp. 2012).
289. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). If however, the evidence
as to disparate impact, legislative intent, and race-based animus is discounted and the stated
class is accepted on its face as being unauthorized immigrants, it would be subject only to a
rational basis test. In that case, any challenge to the Alabama law on equal protection grounds
would face a substantial hurdle.
290. Id.
291. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); Voting Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §
16, 16 Stat. 140 (1870), Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42




Weber: Restricting the Freedom of Contract: A Fundamental Prohibition
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
cant limitations on states' abilities to impose discriminatory laws or con-
done discriminatory conduct. Two laws in particular are of primary im-
portance to our analysis, though one is decidedly more limited in scope and
will be briefly discussed first.
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is iconic legislation associated primarily
with rectifying racial inequalities in the United States during and preceding
the Civil Rights Era. 292 However, its scope was not limited to the traditional
types of discrimination encountered by blacks throughout wide portions of
the United States. Specifically, the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimi-
nation against any individual in public accommodations based on the pro-
tected categories of race, color, religion and national origin.293 The public
accommodation section prohibits discrimination by inns, hotels, motels, etc.
which would seemingly conflict with Alabama's prohibition on contracts
for lodging in excess of one night, provided that the discrimination is seen
as being based on one of the protected categories. 294 The Civil Rights Act of
1964 also prohibits discrimination by gas stations, theaters, athletic venues
and other sources of entertainment. Alabama's law could require these ser-
vice and goods providers to choose between compliance with the 1964 Civil
Rights Act or the local law in specific violation of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act 295 as well as the rules on conflict preemption. 296 Insofar as an elimina-
tion of the right to contract is found to be based on race or national origin in
292. See Sheryll D. Cashin, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Coalition Politics, 49 ST. LouIs U.
L.J. 1029, 1030-31 (2005) (celebrating the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the events which led to
that legislation).
293. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
294. Title II of the Act bars discrimination in public accommodations, including hotels
and restaurants. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (1964) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006)).
295. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-1 (prohibiting state-required discrimination or segregation); 2000h-
4 (expressly preempting state laws that are "inconsistent with any of the purposes of [the Civil
Rights Act]").
296. Although the preemption analysis in Section III.B above focused on immigration-
related issues, this scenario would be a classic example of conflict preemption where a party is
placed in the situation of being able to comply with only one law and simultaneously violate
the other. Under the laws of preemption, the federal Civil Rights Act would prevail over the
Alabama law. Compare Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding that
Congress can exclusively occupy certain legal fields) with Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581 (1889) (stating that the power to naturalize is a sovereign power restricted only by the
constitution), and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (noting that inherent
in sovereign is the right of a nation to restrict the entrance of foreigners), and Chy Lung v.
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) (noting the national role of immigration), and Arizona v. U.S., 132
S.Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (holding "the federal power to determine inunigration policy is well
settled," and this power is "an inherent attribute of sovereignty...").
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the unauthorized immigrant context, the law would run afoul of the 1964
Act.
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
Though useful in our analysis, Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ap-
plies only to the relatively narrow category of discrimination in "places of
public accommodation." 297 42 U.S.C. § 1981 of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 is
far more useful for our purposes. 298 In contrast to § 1982 which by its terms is lim-
ited to citizens of the United States, § 1981 provides that:
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts ... and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens .... 299
In 1991, Congress amended § 1981 to broaden its scope of applicability
in light of recent cases that had limited claims for loss of promotion." In so
doing, it questioned the applicability of the law to both governmental and
private discrimination, 30' and made difficult any claims predicated on dis-
parate impact.302 In the context of a broadened scope, § 1981 should be
found to apply to race or alienage-based classifications that are ostensibly
aimed at Hispanic or Latino immigrants even though the state attempts to
use a false proxy of immigration status as the basis for its legislation.
Section 1981 defines the right of making and enforcing contracts as
"includ[ing] the making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and condi-
tions of the contractual relationship." 303 The law specifically protects
against both private and public attempts to impair the contractual obliga-
297. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006)).
298. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
299. Id. (emphasis added).
300. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
301. Id.
302. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Among the Congressional
Findings of the 1991 amendment was "(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal
civil rights protections . Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat 1071
(1991).
303. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2006).
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tions.3 0 4 While broad in language, it has been interpreted as only prohibit-
ing contractual discrimination based on race 30 or alienage, 306 and not na-
tional origin.307 Even when there is discriminatory treatment based on race,
such treatment will be allowed where the treatment is wholly unrelated to
race or where there is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification which is
not pretextual.*
One problem from excluding national origin based discrimination from
§ 1981 is defining the difference between discrimination based on national
origin and discrimination based on alienage.309 Justice White, in Saint Fran-
cis College v. Al-Khazraji, while noting the distinction, struggled to provide
illustrative examples citing both individuals of Chinese or Arab descent as
examples of discrimination based on alienage rather than country or place
of origin.310 In his concurrence, Justice Brennan would have narrowed the
decision to prevent § 1981 claims based on "birthplace alone." 3 1
One district court went so far as to conclude that § 1981, based solely on
an historical interpretation of its predecessors, was inapplicable to resident
aliens in a private setting-even if the claim is based on alienage rather
than national origin.312 Rather than applying a plain language interpreta-
tion of the statute, the court grasped at what it perceived as congressional
intent in the melding of two former statutes, one which contained a limita-
tion based on citizenship and the other which did not. The court did note
conflicting legislative history where Senator Stewart stated that § 1981was
to be extended to aliens, and that the amendment was to "extend the opera-
tion of the civil rights bill . . . to all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States." However the court was quick to add that the Senator may
have "simply misunderstood the scope of the 1866 Act . since it ap-
304. § 1981(c).
305. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976). Contra De Malherbe v. Int'l Union of
Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp. 1121, 1137 (1977) (refusing to accept arguments based on
dicta that § 1981 applies only to racial discrimination).
306. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971), Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d
1205, 1232 (7th Cir. 1984); Espinoza v. Hillwood Square Mut. Ass'n, 522 F. Supp. 559, 561 (E.D.
Va. 1981).
307. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987).
308. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187 (1989) (elaborating on
pleading requirements to demonstrate whether certain policies are pretextual grounds for dis-
crimination).
309. "One must distinguish 'ancestry or ethnic characteristics' on the one hand from
'place or nation of origin on the other." Duane v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 784 F. Supp. 1209,
1216 n.4 (D. Md. 1992).
310. Al-Kiazraji, 481 U.S. at 613.
311. Id. at 614.
312. De Malherbe, 438 F. Supp. at 1135. Contra Sud v. Import Motors, 379 F. Supp. 1064
(W.D. Mich. 1974) (holding that discrimination claims based on national origin should also be
covered by § 1981).
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peared that four Supreme Court justices also shared his "misconception."
At the time of the amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Senator
Stewart commented at length about the need to extend the protection of the
law to Chinese aliens, clearly showing his understanding of the statutory
language and its intended scope, seemingly for both private and public dis-
crimination. In fact, both preceding and subsequent decisions have af-
firmed Senator Stewart's opinion on the scope of the matter,"' and follow-
ing the 1991 amendments, it appears generally well settled that § 1981
applies to provide a remedy for both public and private discrimination
claims including claims based on alienage. 314
Applying § 1981 to a law revoking unauthorized immigrants' right to
contract, the threshold question is whether the discrimination is based in-
appropriately on alienage or the unprotected grounds (under § 1981) of na-
tional origin. On its face it would appear the classification is based on the
country of birth which would therefore be unprotected. However, using a
disparate impact approach,315 the law appears to be directly solely at His-
panic or Latino immigrants regardless of country of origin.316 As mentioned
above, country of birth and immigration status, which are unprotected clas-
sifications, become false proxies for race and alienage which are protected
by § 1981.
The question then becomes whether courts will accept "Hispanic" or
"Latino" as racial or alienage-based classifications, and on that point courts
313. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529, 537-38 (S.D. Texas 1972),
affd, 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974), Budinsky v. Coming Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786, 787-89
(W.D. Pa. 1977), Espinoza, 522 F. Supp. at 561.
314. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613; Duane v. Geico, 37 F.3d 1036 (4th Cir. 1994); Anderson v.
Conboy, 156 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted United Bd. of Carpenters v. Anderson, 526
U.S. 1086 (1999), cert. dismissed, 527 U.S. 1030 (1999); Duane v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 784 F.
Supp. at 1217; Ortega v. Merit Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Abdulrahim v. Gene B.
Glick Co., 612 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. Ind. 1985). See also Angela M. Ford, Private Alienage Discrimi-
nation and the Reconstruction Amendments: The Constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 49 U. KAN. L.
REV. 457 (2001). Contra Bhandari v. First National Bank of Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082, 1088 n.13,
14 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated by 492 U.S. 901 (1989), reinstated by 887 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1989) (com-
piling cases opining that § 1981 prohibits alienage discrimination).
315. See Waisome v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 948 F.2d 1370, 1374-75
(2d Cir. 1991) (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982), International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n. 15 (1977), Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971), Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 933 F.2d 1140, 1146 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 924 (1991)).
316. Mary Bauer, Court Cites Discriminatory Intent Behind Alabama's Anti-Immigrant Law,
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, (Dec. 14, 2011), http://splcenter.org/get-
informed/news/court-cites-discriminatory-intent-behind-alabamas-anti-immigrant-law (illus-
trating that legislators, while debating the Hammon-Beason legislation, conflated immigration
status with race, specifically deriding the fast growing illegal population and citing Hispanic
population figures and justifying the bill describing "4-foot Mexicans in there catching them
chickens" in the poultry industry).
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have differed greatly with few if any identifiable trends.317 If the questioned
regulation is one which uses an intermediate, unprotected classification as a
proxy for a protected classification that is readily identifiable and related to
the unprotected classification, traditional § 1981 analysis should be applied
to the protected classification. Adopting states' classifications at face value
would reward states for clever derivations of historically protected classifi-
cations toward nominally unprotected ones.
In the case of the Hammon-Beason Act and other immigration status-
based claims, the primary determination in deciding whether to allow a §
1981 claim of race or alienage based on Hispanic or Latino heritage should
be how well the allegations relate to issues of race and/or ancestry versus
country of origin. On its face, the Alabama law is one that attempted to use
the derivative classification of immigration status to ostensibly regulate
groups based on race or alienage. With regard to limiting the right to con-
tract, as intended, it is not clear that Alabama's law singles out characteris-
tics of race and/or ancestry rather than the unprotected classification of
immigration status. As Judge Eubank noted in one opinion, "[t]he line be-
tween discrimination on account of race and discrimination on account of
national origin may be so thin as to be indiscernible; indeed, . . . there may
in some instances be overlap."318 However, looking past the proxy in this
case, it is not difficult to see that the individuals most likely to be affected
on the grounds of their immigration status also comprise a class of individ-
uals who would receive § 1981 protection because of their race or alienage.
Faced with the difficult distinction of classifying Hispanic discrimina-
tion,319 some courts have focused on actual treatment rather than legalistic
distinctions. In Madrigal v. Certainteed Corporation, the court broadly con-
strued § 1981 to cover discrimination against individuals who are perceived
as nonwhite, "even though such racial characterization may be unsound or
317. See, e.g.,. Jones v. United Gas Improv. Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 8 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (rejecting as
based on national origin a distinction based on surnames); Martinez v. Hazelton Research An-
imals, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 186, 187-88 (D. Md. 1977) (noting that the term "Hispanic" encom-
passes individuals who may suffer skin-color based discrimination, but that not all Hispanics
could be classified as nonwhites); Pollard v. Hartford, 539 F. Supp. 1156, 1164-65 (D. Conn.
1982) (allowing § 1981 claims by persons of Hispanic background providing they allege dis-
crimination based on race); Cubas v. Rapid American Corp., 420 F. Supp. 663, 666 (D. Pa. 1976)
(allowing a claim by a Cuban-American and noting the individual's claim contained elements
of racial discrimination); Miranda v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, No. 74-172, 1974 WL
221, at *1 (D.N.J. May 2, 1974) (noting problems with the "anthropological abstract" of discrete
races, and allowing a § 1981 claim by Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics); Gomez v. Pima, 426
F. Supp. 816 (D. Ariz. 1976); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), va-
cated by 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
318. Enriquez v. Honeywell, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 901, 904 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
319. Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 561 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (citing Bullard v.
OMI Georgia, Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1981)) (acknowledging the difficulty in differen-
tiating a national origin and racial claim).
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debatable." 320 In Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., the Tenth Circuit fol-
lowed this perception-based approach in allowing a Mexican American to
bring a § 1981 claim noting the identified group faced considerably differ-
ent treatment than whites.321 In the legislative history of the Alabama Law,
the issue of race was ever-present, and the federal district court judge in a
housing challenge to the Alabama law found that racial animus was clearly
present in the passage of the law.32
The barrier to establishing discrimination against Hispanics as alien-
age-based rather than national origin-based may be high depending on the
jurisdiction, especially in the view of some courts' that, while "Hispanic in-
dividuals may suffer discrimination akin to that suffered by members of
the black race, it is not necessarily true of all Hispanic people."323 However,
many jurisdictions have allowed such claims. In Chance v. Bd. of Examiners
and Bd. of Ed. of City of New York, the court simply decided that discrimina-
tion of Puerto Ricans was race-based even though a national origin claim
would also likely suffice.324 In Apodaca v. General Electric Company, the court
recognized that discrimination against Spanish-surnamed individuals "has
sometimes been based on the perception of them as non-white," 325 clearly a
race-based distinction.326 Given the inherent difficulty in distinguishing be-
tween race- or alienage-based discrimination and national origin-based dis-
crimination in the Hispanic context, courts have given these plaintiffs the
320. Madrigal v. Certainteed Corp., 508 F. Supp. 310,311 (W.D. Mo. 1981):
321. Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979); see also Whatley v.
Skaggs Companies, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 370 (D. Colo. 1980) (allowing § 1981 claims based on
Mexican-American descent).
322. Central Alabama Fair Housing Center v.. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1194 n. 21
(M.D. Ala. 2011) (noting "many other examples in the record provide support for the inference
that Latinos were the target of HB 56."). For example, Rep. Rogers explained that an especially
infuriating situation for him was the fact that some Hispanics elect "white" as a race on their
driver's licenses, when all those he knows are "darker than [he is]." Id. at 1193-94.
323. Martinez v. Hazelton Research Animals, Inc. 430 F. Supp. 186, 187 (D. Md. 1977).
324. 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D. N.Y. 1971). In Chance, the lack of discussion of race versus na-
tional origin likely resulted from the fact that they two individuals challenging the discrimina-
tory practices were black and Puerto Rican respectively. Id. Likewise, in Alvarado v. El Paso In-
dependent School District, the court allowed a discrimination claim based on § 1981 by Mexican
Americans. 445 F.2d 1011 (C.A. Tex. 1971); see also Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110
(C.A. Cal. 1975) (holding discrimination against American Indians constitutes discrimination
based on race).
325. Apodaca v. Gen. Elec. Co., 445 F. Supp. 821,823 (D.N.M. 1978); see also Aponte v. Na-
tional Steel Service Ctr., 500 F. Supp. 198, 202-03 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (stating that Hispanics are of-
ten perceived by society in general as nonwhite).
326. Apodaca, 445 F. Supp. at 823 (citing Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Kates, Jr., Mexican
Americans, Racial Discrimination and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CAL. L. REV. 662 (1975)). In
Apodaca, although the court held that an allegation based on surname alone was insufficient to
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opportunity to prove the discrimination was racially motivated, 327 even
when a national origin-based claim may also be present.
Many other courts have likewise followed the rationale that discrimina-
tion instigated by perceived racial differences qualifies for § 1981 protec-
tion.328 One court, electing to allow a Hispanic-based § 1981 discrimination
claim advance to trial noted the legal need to extend the scope of § 1981's
protection:
These cases [allowing § 1981 claims by Hispanics] recognize that
such persons have been the victims of invidious group discrimina-
tion which, while perhaps not racial in a scientific sense, is racial in
its social operation and perception. The court notes that problems
of proof may arise later in these proceedings because of the lack of
an authoritative and feasible method of discerning the relationship
between national origin and racial discrimination where both are
simultaneously present.329
It is clear that many of the difficulties in determining the scope of §
1981 result directly from the traditional white/nonwhite dichotomy during
the passage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.330 It likewise appears that much of
the discrimination of Hispanics results from perceived racial differences
which § 1981 specifically prohibits. 331 While courts could continue to at-
tempt to distinguish between national origin discrimination and race dis-
crimination on a case-by-case basis, discrimination based on perceived ra-
cial differences and/or actual racial or alienage-based differences should
already suffice for § 1981 protection, 332 and better fulfills the purpose of §
1981.
A simple thought experiment may better illustrate why the Alabama
327. Id. at 823 (citing Enriquez v. Honeywell, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Mar-
tinez v. Hazelton, 430 F. Supp. 186 (D. Md. 1977); Gomez v. Pima County, 426 F. Supp. 816 (D.
Ariz. 1976); Cubas v. Rapid Am. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Hernandez v.
Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752 (D. Ore. 1973)).
328. Ramos v. Flagship Int'l, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 148,152 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that any non-
white group facing prohibited discrimination may sustain a § 1981 cause of action).
329. Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 80 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
affd 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981).
330. See, e.g., Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confindidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as' Race and
Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 69, 139-40 (1998) (identifying the equal protection treat-
ment of race "through the black/white paradigm.").
331. Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent. School Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599, 606 n.30 (S.D.
Tex. 1970) (quoting expert testimony finding Mexican American to be a minority from a racial
point of view).
332. Cubas v. Rapid Am. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 663, 666 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding, " [w]e can-
not find, as a matter of law, that the alleged discrimination against the plaintiff as a Cuban
American did not contain elements of racial discrimination.").
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law restricting the right to vote should be subject to § 1981 protection. As-
sume, for example, a state passed a law declaring any contracts entered into
in that state or with its residents by individuals from West Africa to be
void. If we are to assume that the right to contract is not fundamental, and
likewise that such a provision would withstand equal protection and due
process analysis, it would appear at first blush to also withstand a § 1981
claim as it is applicable to all individuals from West Africa regardless of
race, national origin or other protected class.
However, how do we handle the fact that individuals from West Africa
are overwhelmingly black and the intent (stated or otherwise) of the law
was to primarily limit their rights? Even if we were to expand the scope of
national origin to a geographic region, claims of discrimination based on
national origin are bound to fail under § 1981. Surely, the reviewing court
would find a violation through the use of a geographic definition of indi-
viduals as a simple proxy for race. 333 Evidence of any attempt to discrimi-
nate via proxy could be found in public statements indicating racial ani-
mosity behind the law. This would be the result even if the state were to
provide evidence that black and white individuals from West Africa were
treated equally.
Continuing the thought experiment, what if the state were to pass a
similar law affecting only individuals from Western Europe where there
are also issues of different countries of origin and languages spoken?
Whereas the first law would seem problematic, the second law, though ir-
rational, may not suffer from a § 1981 claim as there is no perceived racial
or alienage component. The question then is whether a similar law aimed
ostensibly at unauthorized immigrants with a disproportionate impact on
Hispanic or Latino individuals is more like the first or second example, and
that of course will depend to what extent the reviewing court recognizes
"unauthorized immigrant" as a limited proxy for "Hispanic," and then
whether discrimination based on Hispanic heritage is race- or alienage-
based, which many courts have already allowed.3 To the extent § 1981
protects Hispanics from discrimination based on alienage or race, the Ala-
bama law violates its prohibition on contractual rights.
On a final note regarding § 1981 applicability, many commentators
have recognized the similarities between today's situation with unauthor-
333. In an equal protection context, Justice Kennedy noted that the utilization of an ethnic
trait as "a surrogate for race" would violate the equal protection clause as a "pretext for racial
discrimination." Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371-72 (1991).
334. E.g., Ramos v. Flagship Int'l Inc., 612 F. Supp. 148, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that
any non-white group facing prohibited discrimination may sustain a § 1981 cause of action),
Apodaca v. Gen. Elec. Co., 445 F. Supp. 821, 823 (D.N.M. 1978) (recognizing a potential claim
of discrimination against individuals with Spanish surnames based on the perception of the
individuals as "non-white," and therefore racially based).
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ized Hispanic workers and the circumstances faced by Chinese immigrants
in the latter half of the nineteenth century.335 It seems anomalous that those
Chinese immigrant laborers would be treated better under § 1981 today on
the grounds that the discrimination against them was race- or alienage-
based rather than national origin or some other unprotected category. As
Senator Stewart stated: "While [Chinese aliens] are here I say it is our duty
to protect them... It is as solemn a duty as can be devolved upon this Con-
gress to see that those people are protected, to see that they have the equal
protection of the laws, notwithstanding that they are aliens." 336
Any legalistic distinction that attempts to distinguish between unlawful
treatment of Chinese immigrants as race- or alienage-based on the one
hand versus similar unlawful treatment of Hispanic immigrants as national
origin-based on the other seems unnecessarily strained and likely incorrect.
To the extent a law focuses on a specific subset of individuals with largely
shared physical characteristics so closely related to race and ancestry, espe-
cially with clearly expressed animosity as in the Alabama case, it should be
construed as an improper classification based on alienage or race subject to
§ 1981 claims.337
IV. CONCLUSION
The general right to contract, that is, the general right of one individual
to obligate himself and to receive another's obligation in return is a funda-
mental, though not unlimited right. History has shown that the ability to
contract, to order ones affairs and to obtain contractually guaranteed pay-
335. E.g., Ashleigh Bausch Varley & Mary C. Snow, Don't You Dare Live Here: The Consti-
tutionality Of The Anti-Immigrant Employment And Housing Ordinances At Issue In Keller v. City
of Fremont, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 542-44 (2011-12), B.J. Smith, Comment, Emma Lazarus
Weeps: State-Based Anti-Immigration Initiatives and the Federalism Challenge, 80 UMKC L. REV. 905
(2012), Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti-"Alien" Laws and Unity-
Rebuilding Frames for Antidiscrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905 (2011).
336. CONG. GLOBE, 41sT CONG., 2D SEss. 3658 (1870).
337. While admittedly a difficult question, courts should analyze more rigorously than
they have in the past how the concepts of race and alienage intersect with demographers' def-
initions of Hispanic or Latinos. For the purposes of this article, I argue that courts should ap-
ply § 1981 to Hispanics and Latinos in the Hammon-Beason context because it is irrelevant to
my argument whether there are real or perceived differences in race when there is in fact dis-
parate treatment. In doing so, the intent is not to entrench any legal dichotomy between real
and perceived racial differences, but to establish why § 1981 should apply regardless of any
individual biases with regard to the real and perceived differences argument. A better struc-
tural approach, however, would require the courts to grapple with and digest the fact that
scholars have long discredited the notion that "race" is defined solely in relation to biological-
ly or scientifically real distinctions, a conclusion that further compels § 1981 protection. See
generally IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCION OF RACE (2d ed., 2006).
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ments in exchange for services or goods is fundamental to the ability of any
individual to succeed in a market economy. Any state's attempt to prohibit
this freedom of contract, especially when directed against protected classes
of individuals, should be struck down on multiple constitutional and fed-
eral statutory grounds. For the Alabama Law, these grounds include
preemption, due process, equal protection, the Civil Rights Acts, and, as
Alabama's law was originally drafted, the Contract Clause.
In both the United States and the rest of the world, the history of status-
based restrictions of the right to contract has been laced with invidiousness
and an attempt to maintain a class of citizens below that of the ruling class.
Typically, the class of individual targeted for discriminatory treatment has
been singled out due to what we now consider to be protected, immutable
attributes such as race, gender and alienage. Now unauthorized immi-
grants in Alabama, who are largely comprised of Latinos, are being singled
out in a similar fashion in an attempt to make life as inhospitable as possi-
ble by denying one of our most important rights.
It is nearly impossible to fathom our society without a robust right to
contract with which to order our commercial and personal affairs. Ala-
bama's attempt to restrict the basic right to contract for a "discrete and in-
sular minority" based on an immutable characteristic would be a reversion
to earlier times when certain classes of individuals such as women and
blacks were deemed legally incompetent to contract based solely on their
status as women or blacks. As recent history has shown, the rights of mi-
nority groups who have been historically disadvantaged should continue to
move toward parity with that of the more privileged classes. In order to do
so, broad protection should be provided for a fundamental right to con-
tract. Therefore, these protections would extend to the general ability of an
individual to contractually obligate himself, but would not prohibit states
from capacity-based restrictions that generally prevent parties from taking
undue advantage of legally incapacitated individuals. In this sense, states
maintain the right to partially regulate certain classes of contracts. At the
same time, they would be prohibited from enacting status-based re-
strictions aimed at discrete segments of the population on the broader, fun-
damental right to contract.
The law is clear that attempts to discriminate based on improper classi-
fications are unlawful. The law should be equally clear that any attempt to
use a false proxy as a facially neutral tool to discriminate against a protect-
ed class should also be recognized as improper. The Hammon-Beason Act
or similar laws targeting unauthorized immigrants' right to contract and
subsist within the United States should continue to be invalidated on
preemption, equal protection, due process or Civil Rights Act grounds.
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